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SURVEILLANCE BY ALGORITHM: THE NSA, COMPUTERIZED 
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Peter Margulies* 
Abstract 
 ISIS’s cultivation of social media has reinforced states’ interest in 
using automated surveillance. However, automated surveillance using 
artificial intelligence (“machine learning”) techniques has also sharpened 
privacy concerns that have been acute since Edward Snowden’s 
disclosures. This Article examines machine-based surveillance by the 
NSA and other intelligence agencies through the prism of international 
human rights.  
 Two camps have clashed on the human rights implications of machine 
surveillance abroad. The state-centric camp argues that human rights 
agreements like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) do not apply extraterritorially. Moreover, the state-centric camp 
insists, machine surveillance is inherently unintrusive, like a dog seeing 
a human step out of the shower. Surveillance critics respond that machine 
and human access to data are equivalent invasions of privacy and legal 
protections must be equal for individuals within a state’s borders and non-
nationals overseas. In a controversial recent decision, Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner, the European Court of Justice appeared to side 
with surveillance’s critics.  
 This Article argues that both the state-centric and critical positions are 
flawed. This Article agrees with surveillance critics that the ICCPR 
applies extraterritorially. Machine access to data can cause both 
ontological harm, stemming from individuals’ loss of spontaneity, and 
consequential harm, stemming from errors that machines compound in 
databases such as no-fly lists. However, the Schrems decision went too 
far by failing to acknowledge that human rights law provides states with 
a measure of deference in confronting threats such as ISIS. Deference on 
overseas surveillance is particularly appropriate given U.N. Security 
Council resolutions urging states to deny terrorists safe havens. But 
deference cannot be absolute. To provide appropriate safeguards, this 
Article recommends that machine searches abroad be tailored to 
compelling state purposes, scientifically validated, and subject to 
independent review. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Searching for a needle in a haystack is a metaphor for human futility, 
but searching for a fact in a haystack of data is just more code for a 
computer.1 Nevertheless, appreciation for the computer’s prowess has not 
translated into applause for automated surveillance. Concerned 
commentators invoke Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, in which minders 
perpetually keep tabs on inmates.2 Others assert that automated 
surveillance designed to detect overseas terrorists such as Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) recruits3 is ineffective, echoing humans’ ill-fated 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See IAN H. WITTEN ET AL., DATA MINING 21–22 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing private sector 
data mining of Internet usage patterns).  
 2. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT 
YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 32 (2015); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK 
92–93 (2007).  
 3. ISIS, also known as ISIL or the Islamic State, is fighting the Assad regime and Western-
backed forces in Syria, gaining control of territory in Iraq, and inspiring recruits to violence 
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haystack dives.4 Suppose, however, that technological progress makes 
computer (machine) searches effective tools in locating overseas 
terrorists.5 That promise should prompt inquiry into machine searches’ 
status under human rights law.6   
In the international realm, Article 17 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits arbitrary intrusions on 
privacy.7 This Article argues that states should receive a measure of 
deference in using scientifically validated machine searches to collect 
overseas intelligence, subject to both substantive and procedural 
constraints. Privacy objections to machine searches are not wholly 
misplaced. However, such objections should be tempered by awareness 
of the positive role safeguards can play and the advantages that properly 
cabined automated surveillance provides.   
This safeguard-centered approach to machine access contrasts with 
both a state-centric approach and the position of critics of state 
surveillance. A state-centric approach might view international machine 
access as entirely appropriate, even without meaningful safeguards. In 
keeping with this view, the U.S. position is that the ICCPR does not bind 
states parties extraterritorially.8 A state-centric view regards machine 
                                                                                                                     
worldwide. See Anne Barnard & Michael R. Gordon, Goals Diverge and Perils Remain as U.S. 
and Turkey Take on ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/world 
/middleeast/us-and-turkey-agree-to-create-isis-free-zone-in-syria.html. 
 4. See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1661 (2010). 
 5. The term “machine search” refers to a search conducted by a computer or computer 
network at human initiative or under human direction. When using a machine search, human 
analysts may not review all the data accessed by the machine but may only view a far smaller set 
of data outputs. Professor William Banks acknowledges that machine searches of massive troves 
of data, sometimes called “data mining,” may be effective as a “preliminary screening method” 
in identifying terrorists. See id.; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PROTECTING 
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISTS 4, 77 (2008) (discussing risks and 
possible benefits of counterterrorism data mining). Given the difficulty in identifying violent 
extremists and the risks posed by false negatives (here, terrorists erroneously classified as 
innocents), even a “preliminary” detection method has promise. 
 6. While this Article touches on the domestic use of machine searches, it leaves extended 
discussion of Fourth Amendment issues to others. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 21–47 
(providing a comprehensive approach to new technology); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data 
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 388–92 (2015) (cataloguing risks 
and benefits of new technology and its effect on the Fourth Amendment). In searches abroad, 
targeting persons with no ties to the United States, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 274–75 (1990). 
 7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
177 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 8. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, ANNEX I (2005) [hereinafter STATE DEP’T PERIODIC 
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access as inherently free of the intrusiveness of human access.9  
In contrast, critics of state surveillance in general and U.S. 
surveillance in particular posit what this Article refers to as the 
equivalency thesis. The thesis contains three interrelated propositions. 
First, surveillance critics claim that machine and human access are 
equivalent invasions of privacy.10 Second, critics assert that the United 
States’ technological capabilities—not the law—drive government 
surveillance practices.11 Third, critics claim that human rights law 
requires equivalent protections for both U.S. and non-U.S. persons.12  
This Article argues that both the state-centric and equivalency thesis 
are wrong. Taking issue with the state-centric approach, this Article 
                                                                                                                     
REPORTS]; see also Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 291, 307 (2015) (observing that the “United States has long interpreted the ICCPR not to 
apply extraterritorially”); Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human 
Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2143 (2014). 
 9. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 
254 (2008) (arguing that machine searches do not intrude on privacy because computers are not 
“sentient beings”). For a more nuanced critique of privacy advocates’ assumptions, see William 
H. Simon, Rethinking Privacy, BOS. REV. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://bostonreview.net/books-
ideas/william-simon-rethinking-privacy-surveillance (asserting that privacy advocates derive 
their views from an illusory baseline in which individuals form their identities uninfluenced by 
the views of others). 
 10. See SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 130 (arguing that surveillance conducted via computer 
algorithms is materially identical to human surveillance in terms of intrusiveness).  
 11. In other words, the U.S. and other states will generally do whatever they are 
technologically capable of doing. See Ryan Devereaux et al., Data Pirates of the Caribbean: The 
NSA Is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas, INTERCEPT (May 19, 2014, 12:37 PM), 
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-
phone-call-bahamas/ (quoting Michael German, former American Civil Liberties Union counsel 
and former FBI agent, as observing that intelligence officials “have this mentality—if we can, we 
will”); cf. Axel Arnbak & Sharon Goldberg, Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution: 
Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network Traffic Abroad, 21 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317, 319–22 (2015) (arguing that surveillance conducted by National 
Security Agency (NSA) is driven by technological capabilities and unconstrained by provisions 
of relevant law).  
 12. E.g., David Cole, We Are All Foreigners: NSA Spying and the Rights of Others, JUST 
SECURITY (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:48 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/2668/foreigners-nsa-spying-
rights/ (critiquing U.S. surveillance policy overseas as inconsistent with human rights); see also 
Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism), Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept. 
23, 2014) (asserting that states are “legally bound to afford the same protection to nationals and 
non-nationals, and to those within and outside their jurisdiction”); Jennifer Granick, Foreigners 
and the Review Group Report: Part 2, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:47 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/4838/foreigners-review-group-report-part-2/ (welcoming a Review 
Group’s recommendation to limit U.S. surveillance of non-U.S. persons). A U.S. person within 
the meaning of this Article refers to a U.S. citizen or lawful resident, or an individual of any 
nationality or immigration status who is physically present in the United States.  
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demonstrates that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially. Moreover, 
unfettered machine access abroad would violate the ICCPR’s prohibition 
on arbitrary intrusions on privacy. At the same time, this Article argues 
that the equivalency thesis’s propositions each miss the mark. Consider 
the proposition that human and machine access are equally intrusive. 
Although unfettered machine access is problematic, computers’ lack of 
consciousness suggests that cabined machine access is consistent with 
human rights law.13 Safeguards that limit human access can ensure that 
some level of machine access passes muster.  
This Article also identifies flaws in the equivalency thesis’s second 
assertion, which this Article calls the technological imperative: 
government practice will inevitably extend to the limits of government 
capabilities.14 While advances in technology can exert a powerful 
gravitational pull on operations, the technological imperative fails to 
reckon with the robust safeguards, such as search filters, that technology 
can impose on both human and machine searches. In addition, 
surveillance critics who embrace the technological imperative as a 
descriptive matter ignore legal safeguards that limit state surveillance. 
Dismissing current safeguards may impose too high a bar for reform, 
since any protections that are likely to be adopted may also earn critics’ 
disdain. Critics eager to proclaim the virtues of freedom and progress15 
do not always grasp Voltaire’s observation that the perfect is the enemy 
of the good.16 
The equivalency theorists’ second assertion also fails to address a 
paradox that emerges from the interaction of accuracy and transparency 
in machine data analysis. A nuanced account would distinguish between 
directed techniques using keywords submitted by human analysts and 
autonomous techniques in which analysts input data and machines then 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 195 (explaining that machine searches 
accompanied by restrictions on analysts’ queries of the resulting database could preserve 
anonymity and therefore reduce intrusions on privacy). 
 14. Surveillance critics use this assertion for descriptive purposes; as a normative matter, 
they argue vigorously that the government should not collect everything it can collect. See, e.g., 
SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 92–98 (addressing privacy rights and abuse of government 
surveillances). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 97–98. 
 16. However, privacy advocates are right to assert that the temptations posed by the 
technological imperative require further privacy safeguards, including independent review of 
intelligence collection and a public advocate at the United States’ Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (the FISC) who will provide a voice opposing the government’s surveillance 
requests. See Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA “Special 
Advocate,” JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/2873/fisa-
special-advocate-constitution/ (discussing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s 
“special advocate” proposal).  
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find patterns independent of explicit human commands.17 Autonomous 
techniques give rise to what this Article refers to as the transparency 
paradox: these searches use “hidden layers” of computing power to group 
myriad variables more accurately.18 However, because the layers assess 
so many variables, analysts cannot provide a substantive verbal 
explanation for courts or other legal gatekeepers seeking an articulable 
justification for individual searches. As a result, the law could preclude 
more accurate techniques, while embracing techniques that produced 
more errors but provided the familiar comforts of a verbal explanation. 
Surveillance critics avoid this issue by dismissing the accuracy of 
autonomous searches in the counterterrorism context.19 If they are wrong 
about accuracy, however, the transparency paradox becomes too 
important to ignore.  
The equivalency theorists’ third proposition—a state must accord the 
same rights to its nationals and persons overseas—also ignores both 
practicality and precedent. The ICCPR, as the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) acknowledged in Weber v. Germany,20 gives states 
greater leeway in surveillance of transnational communications than in 
surveillance of domestic communications.21 Transnational surveillance 
with safeguards can assist in vindicating international norms, such as the 
framework of cooperation against ISIS and other terrorist groups 
established in United Nations Security Council resolutions 217822 and 
1373.23 Measured overseas surveillance can compensate for the ability of 
extremist non-state actors to find safe havens in weak states. In addition, 
while transnational surveillance can diminish privacy, it can also enhance 
privacy by combating rogue cyber states and non-state actors who breach 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Cf. STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 694–95 (3d ed. 
2010) (describing the three types of feedback that determine learning: unsupervised learning, 
reinforcement learning, and supervised learning). 
 18. See WITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 467, 469. 
 19. E.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 136–39.  
 20. 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.  
 21. See id. at paras. 87–88; Sarah St. Vincent, International Law and Secret Surveillance: 
Binding Restrictions upon State Monitoring of Telephone and Internet Activity, CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 4, 2014), https://cdt.org/files/2014/09/CDT-IL-surveillance.pdf. The 
ECHR’s deferential approach suggests that European and U.S. legal analysis of the intersection 
of privacy and national security may not be all that different, despite differences in rhetoric; cf. 
Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of 
Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 632–33 (2007) (noting parallels in European 
and U.S. conceptions); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004) (arguing that the United States protects privacy to 
safeguard liberty, while Europeans view privacy as central to dignity, which they define as sparing 
the individual from unwelcome public attention). 
 22. S.C. Res. 2178, paras. 2–4 (Sept. 24, 2014). 
 23. S.C. Res. 1373, paras. 1–3 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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privacy protections.24 Moreover, overseas surveillance can be appropriate 
under the law of armed conflict (LOAC) as a form of reconnaissance.25  
In light of these concerns, this Article defends a measure of deference 
for states’ overseas machine surveillance. Just as the ECHR has accorded 
states a “margin of appreciation” in taking steps that protect security and 
public safety,26 the proportionality inquiry underwritten by the ICCPR 
Article 17 arbitrariness standard should be deferential. However, a 
measure of deference does not entail a blank check.  
This Article proposes three elements of accountability for machine 
surveillance: First, surveillance must be for a compelling purpose, such 
as national security,27 and should be tailored to that goal. For example, 
bulk collection of the content of another state’s communications should 
be prohibited, unless the state whose data is collected is involved in an 
armed conflict with the collecting state. Under this test, the United States 
could continue to engage in bulk collection in Afghanistan for the 
duration of the armed conflict there but could not engage in bulk 
surveillance of content in the Bahamas, where the United States 
reportedly conducts bulk surveillance of all communications to reach the 
far smaller set of narcotics and human traffickers.28 Second, searches 
should be reliable and subject to accepted techniques for validation. To 
deal with the transparency paradox that affects autonomous searches, this 
Article argues that human rights law should accept a methodological 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 229 & n.38 
(2016). 
 25. Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and International 
Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 595, 595–98 (2012) 
(analyzing surveillance and reconnaissance in the context of using drones for targeted killing 
during an armed conflict). 
 26. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), paras. 47, 66 (1976) 
(regulating public dissemination of information about human sexuality to protect children). The 
ECHR’s use of the margin of appreciation in cases involving free expression provides an a fortiori 
case for the margin’s materiality in adjudicating surveillance. 
 27. These include the limits that President Barack Obama outlined in Presidential Policy 
Directive No. 28 (PPD-28), which restricted bulk collection of content abroad to specific 
purposes, such as countering terrorism, espionage, arms proliferation, cybercrime or other 
international lawbreaking, or evasion of lawful sanctions. See Press Release, Office of the Press 
Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive – Signals Intelligence Activities (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-inte 
lligence-activities [hereinafter PPD-28]. The U.S. government distinguishes between bulk and 
targeted collection. Id. Bulk collection obtains virtually all communications content or other data 
for subsequent analysis, while targeted collection obtains only data that corresponds to certain 
specific identifiers. See PPD-28 Section 4 Procedures, USSID SP0018: Supplemental Procedures 
for the Collection, Processing, Retention, and Dissemination of Signals Intelligence Information 
and Data Containing Personal Information of Non-United States Persons, at 7 n.1–2 (Jan. 12, 
2015) [hereinafter PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures]. 
 28. See Devereaux et al., supra note 11.  
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explanation of a machine search’s validity in place of a substantive verbal 
explanation.  
Third, review must be independent. Decisions by the ECHR29 and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), including the 2015 
decision in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner30 and the 2014 
decision in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Ireland,31 require some level of 
independent review of surveillance.32 The United States provides judicial 
review of much of its surveillance through the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC).33 To complement the FISC, it should also 
create an executive branch agency to review surveillance under Executive 
Order 12,333, a Reagan Administration measure that authorizes the 
collection of intelligence.34 The new agency should be shielded from 
political influence to the maximum degree possible under the U.S. 
Constitution. The agency should address complaints by individuals that 
their personal data has been wrongfully collected, retained, or 
disseminated. Moreover, the FISC should have input from a robust voice 
that opposes government surveillance requests. The provision for amici 
curiae in the newly enacted USA Freedom Act35 improves the situation. 
So does the provision for a State Department ombudsperson in Privacy 
Shield, the EU–U.S. data transfer agreement that replaces the agreement 
invalidated by the CJEU in Schrems.36 However, more improvement is 
needed.  
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I explains the way in which 
machine searches operate and the sources of U.S. legal authority for their 
use. Part II considers both deontological and consequentialist arguments 
on whether machine access is less intrusive than human access. It 
concludes that while machine access is less intrusive on both 
deontological and consequential grounds, safeguards are necessary for 
deploying it. Part III considers surveillance critics’ claim that a state’s 
surveillance capabilities dictate its surveillance practices. This Part, while 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See, e.g., Zakharov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 147 (2015); Kennedy v. United 
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 79–80 (2010). 
 30. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R.    
 31. Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Comm’r, 2014 E.C.R. 
 32. See Banks, supra note 4, at 1661; Deeks, supra note 8, at 358.  
 33. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2016).   
 34. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941–42 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
 35. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i) (2012); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article 
III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1161, 1179 (2015) (suggesting that “special advocate” in FISC 
proceedings who would oppose government requests in a wider range of cases would ameliorate 
concerns that the provisions for FISC review of surveillance procedures under § 702 violate 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which governs the role of federal courts).  
 36. See European Comm’n, Commission Implementing Decision Pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection 
Provided by the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield 26 (Feb. 2016) [hereinafter EC Adequacy Decision]. 
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acknowledging that the technological imperative to expand capability 
influences surveillance practice, notes that privacy advocates unduly 
discount both technology’s potential to protect against intrusive searches 
and the power of legal safeguards to curb abuses.  
Part IV considers the state-centric view that human rights agreements 
like the ICCPR do not apply extraterritorially and shows that the ICCPR’s 
language and purpose support extraterritorial application. Part V suggests 
a normative framework for machine surveillance overseas, in light of the 
ICCPR’s prohibition on arbitrary intrusions. This framework is 
deferential because of the need to accommodate conflicting international 
norms, including Security Council resolutions against terrorism and 
LOAC, as well as the privacy benefits of surveillance targeting 
international cyber criminals. However, the framework’s deference is not 
absolute. To ensure accountability, the model requires that states tailor 
surveillance to a compelling purpose, demonstrate the reliability of their 
machine surveillance through commonly accepted scientific methods, 
and provide for independent review and recourse. These safeguards will 
allow governments to utilize machine searches to protect the public while 
also protecting privacy.  
I.  INSIDE THE MACHINE: COMPUTERS AND SURVEILLANCE 
Because “Big Data” is too big for humans to process, machine 
searches are increasingly important in both government and the private 
sector.37 Such searches can entail different methods of gaining access to 
data, which in the United States typically have different sources of legal 
authority. This Part distinguishes between scanning and collection; it then 
divides the latter into bulk and targeted collection.  
Different types of machine searches can also entail more or less 
human involvement. This Part describes directed machine searches, 
which require supervision from a human analyst. It then describes 
autonomous searches, where humans feed data to a machine, permit the 
machine to find patterns on its own, and then validate the results. Each 
method has trade-offs. This Article defines one of these crucial trade-offs 
as the transparency paradox: in autonomous searches, accuracy often 
improves at the expense of transparency. Machines that are fed enough 
data can discern patterns that humans would miss. However, because of 
the volume of data involved in such searches and the number of variables 
that the machine analyzes, humans cannot offer a substantive, verbal 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See Jorge Garcia, Machine Learning and Cognitive Systems: The Next Evolution of 
Enterprise Intelligence (Part I), WIRED, http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/07/machine-
learning-cognitive-systems-next-evolution-enterprise-intelligence-part/ (last visited Mar. 18, 
2016).  
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explanation of the machine’s reasoning path. This raises a legal issue that 
this Article addresses in subsequent Parts: ranking transparency and 
accuracy, when enhancing one value will sacrifice the other.38  
A.  Scanning Versus Collection 
If one analogizes machine access to living arrangements, scanning is 
like a quick visit, while collection resembles a lengthy stay. Scanning 
intrudes on privacy in passing, while collection contemplates the storage 
of data by the collecting entity. The differences between scanning and 
collection matter less in the private sector, where scanning of internet 
users’ data is ubiquitous and recurring. Those differences have higher 
stakes for the government’s machine access.  
1.  Scanning in Government and the Private Sector  
Scanning involves the recurring inspection, usually by machine, of 
information from individuals, but it does not entail the storage of all the 
information by the scanning party. A private firm or government agency, 
respectively, can scan a user’s email, as Google does with Gmail, or gain 
access to interchange points in the transmission of internet 
communications, as the U.S. government does pursuant to statute.39 For 
example, in scanning pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act,40 the NSA’s machines gain 
access through a buffer, cache, or other device that temporarily stores 
transnational communications in the course of transmitting them to their 
destination. Scanning is by definition a process that allows machines to 
gain access to a huge volume of communications, the vast majority of 
which are substantively irrelevant. In the process of scanning, the 
machine selects material that is relevant and designates that material for 
collection and subsequent analysis.  
In the commercial internet space, scanning is not a part of the business 
model; it is the business model.41 Google’s computers use algorithms 
devised by Google’s own engineers or searches crafted by the firm’s 
computers to scan users’ web-browsing histories and the contents of 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See infra Section I.C.  
 39. In re Government’s Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification for 702 
Program, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5, *19–20, *23 (Foreign Intell. Surveillance Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) 
(describing government’s use of designated “facilities” and “selectors” with links to terrorism or 
other foreign intelligence information, including not only communications to or from phone 
numbers or e-mail addresses, but also communications “about” these identifiers). 
 40. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). 
 41. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 49 (noting that “[s]urveillance is the business model of the 
Internet”); see also Ferguson, supra note 6, at 358–59 (discussing the commercial rationale for 
corporate data mining). 
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individuals’ emails.42 Private firms engage in such scanning for two key 
reasons. First, firms refine their knowledge of users’ aggregate browsing 
practices, which Google then uses to make its searches and search 
rankings more precise.43 Second, Google and other firms gather 
information about particular users, which firms use to tailor web-based 
advertising to that user’s habits and interests.44  
The U.S. government uses scanning internationally but not 
domestically. Both the Constitution and various statutes preclude the 
government from scanning the content of purely domestic 
communications—communications between two individuals located 
within the United States.45 However, under FISA, the U.S. government 
scans devices such as buffers and caches used in international 
communications—communications between a person in the United 
States and a person that government officials reasonably believe to be 
located overseas.46 Under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See Samuel Gibbs, Gmail Does Scan All Emails, New Google Terms Clarify, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 15, 2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/apr/15/gmail-scans-all-
emails-new-google-terms-clarif; Steven Levy, Exclusive: How Google’s Algorithm Rules the 
Web, WIRED (Feb. 22, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/02/ff_google_algorithm/. 
Private sector scanning is premised on either express or implicit consent by internet users. See In 
re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 584–85 (N.D. Cal. 2015); cf. BENJAMIN WITTES & 
GABRIELA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE 135 (2015) (arguing that users’ web data “tends to be 
material we have disclosed to others, often in exchange for some benefit and often with the 
understanding . . . that it will be aggregated and mined for what it might say about us”). 
 43. See Levy, supra note 42.  
 44. See Gibbs, supra note 42.   
 45. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490, 2494–95 (2014) (in holding that a digital 
search of a suspect’s cell phone is not a search incident to arrest and therefore requires a warrant, 
the Court described the cell phone as a “cache of sensitive personal information”); cf. Orin S. 
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 291–92 (2015) 
(discussing case law on the effect of borders on Fourth Amendment rights). But see Jennifer 
Daskal, The Un-territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 364–66 (2015) (arguing that national 
borders are an artificial and outmoded basis for determining Fourth Amendment limits on data 
searches). Government scanning of domestic communications content for data mining on 
terrorism would be problematic on legal, ethical, and policy grounds. Cf. James X. Dempsey & 
Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1466–67 
(2004) (warning of the adverse privacy consequences of government data mining of domestic 
records for pattern-based searches). 
 46. PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 7 n.2 (permitting temporary 
acquisition of data “to facilitate targeted collection, such as search and development 
activities . . . or the processing of a signal that is necessary to select specific communications for 
forwarding for intelligence analysis”). Some have argued that intelligence agency access to 
international data outside the purview of bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) is 
problematic. This Article focuses on human rights issues, and the role of MLATs is beyond its 
scope. It is worth noting that the ECHR has held that transnational surveillance of another 
country’s nationals does not violate the sovereignty of that country because no physical intrusion 
occurs. See Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 81; Joris V.J. van Hoboken & Ira S. 
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2008, which Congress enacted with votes from liberal legislators, 
including then-Senator Barack Obama, the United States can gain access 
to such communications.47 However, Section 702 and policies 
implementing the statute impose limits on the government’s collection of 
such data.48 Describing those limits requires unpacking the distinction 
between targeted and bulk collection.  
2.  Targeted and Bulk Collection 
Targeted collection entails the use of particularized identifiers or 
selectors to winnow out irrelevant scanned data. Under Section 702, U.S. 
intelligence agencies can store the content of calls between persons in the 
United States and those reasonably believed to be located outside the 
country only if scans have revealed that such communications include 
specific selectors, such as phone numbers, email addresses, and discrete 
topics related to national security or foreign affairs.49 The FISC approves 
procedures under Section 702, although it does not approve specific 
selectors in advance.50  
                                                                                                                     
Rubinstein, Privacy and Security in the Cloud: Some Realism About Technical Solutions to 
Transnational Surveillance in the Post-Snowden Era, 66 ME. L. REV. 487, 490 (2014). A 
country’s consent to another state’s surveillance would address concerns about sovereignty but 
would not trump human rights. See Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 25.  
 47. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012); see also David R. Shedd, Paul Rosenzweig & Charles 
D. Stimson, Maintaining America’s Ability to Collect Foreign Intelligence: The Section 702 
Program, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 13, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/
05/maintaining-americas-ability-to-collect-foreign-intelligence-the-section-702-program (noting 
§ 702’s effectiveness at producing foreign intelligence); Chris Inglis & Jeff Kosseff, In Defense 
of FAA Section 702: An Examination of Its Justification, Operational Employment, and Legal 
Underpinnings (Hoover Inst. Series Paper No. 1604, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-
faa-section-702-examination-its-justification-operational-employment-and-legal-underpinnings 
(same). 
 48. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b).  
 49. See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
ACT 32–33 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf; cf. PPD-28 Supplemental 
Procedures, supra note 27, para. 3.4, at 6 (noting that United States can collect “foreign private 
commercial information or trade secrets” for limited purposes, such as detecting violations of fair 
trade laws or sanctions, but not to supply U.S. firms with a competitive advantage).  
 50. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)–(i) (noting that the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence must file certifications under Section 702 with FISC for review). Professor Daphna 
Renan has helpfully analogized the FISC’s role to that of an administrative agency setting 
parameters for a regulated industry. See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative 
Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1103–08 (2016); cf. Zachary K. Goldman, The Emergence 
of Intelligence Governance, in GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 207, 230–32 (Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds. 2016) 
(discussing role of courts in framing incentives for executive action and forcing greater 
transparency); Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2016) 
(discussing role of the President in coordinating principled and collaborative approach to 
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In contrast, bulk collection involves the collection of a mass of data, 
which analysts subsequently query using selectors or other methods.51 In 
bulk collection, much of the data collected is by definition substantively 
irrelevant. Suppose that the government wishes to sort through the 
content of communications in a foreign state to uncover individuals’ 
efforts to join ISIS, Al Qaeda, or the Taliban. Despite ISIS’s popularity 
in some quarters, in any state only a tiny minority of communications will 
concern ISIS recruiting—most will deal with countless other more 
mundane issues, from personal, family, and business matters to 
entertainment, recreation, and so on.52 However, collecting these 
substantively irrelevant communications is nonetheless relevant 
methodologically to a state’s efforts to protect its nationals or those of 
other countries from ISIS.53 Bulk collection ensures that the government 
has a database that is comprehensive when it searches for specific content 
about ISIS recruiting. While scanning is evanescent because information 
is not stored, collection gives the government access to communications 
over time. That enables the government to search more effectively for 
evolving patterns in ISIS’s communications. For example, if ISIS uses 
different forms of encryption or code to hide its communications, 
collecting information in bulk will allow the government to trace the 
evolution of ISIS’s tradecraft. In contrast, relying on scanning or targeted 
collection fails to reckon with ISIS’s ability to transform its tactics.  
                                                                                                                     
intelligence oversight); Carrie Cordero, A Response to Professor Samuel Rascoff’s Presidential 
Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 104 (2016) (observing that the importance of speed and secrecy 
in collecting intelligence to serve national interests will pose challenges for any comprehensive 
regulatory scheme, and that position of Director of National Intelligence provides requisite 
professionalism in intelligence collection together with insulation from politics). 
 51. PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 7 n.1 (defining bulk collection); 
see also David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 209, 217–18 (2014) (discussing the bulk collection of domestic call record data and use of 
identifiers to query such data under the USA Patriot Act prior to the effective date of the 2015 
USA Freedom Act that reformed this program in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations). 
 52. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 78 (observing that 
“terrorists and terrorist activity are rare” and “[d]ata specifically associated with terrorists . . . are 
sparse”); Dempsey & Flint, supra note 45, at 1470 (noting that agencies searching for patterns 
linked to terrorists “have a very small sample set on which to base their predictions”).  
 53. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, B.R. 
No. 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562, at *7 (FISC June 29, 2015) (holding that the collection of metadata 
under the pre-USA Freedom Act provision of the USA Patriot Act was “designed to permit the 
government wide latitude to seek the information it needs to meet its national security 
responsibilities”); Kris, supra note 51, at 235 (discussing FISC’s conception of relevance under 
pre-USA Freedom Act statutory provision, Section 215 of USA Patriot Act, which has now been 
amended to bar government collection of metadata and require the government to seek a court 
order to obtain call records from telecommunications firms). But see ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 
787, 815–16 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Section 215 defined information that was “relevant” to 
an investigation in a narrower manner that did not authorize government collection of metadata).  
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The United States has used bulk collection in two principal contexts. 
First, before the USA Freedom Act became fully effective, the 
government, with authorization from the FISC, collected most domestic 
land-line call records (metadata, as opposed to content) detailing both 
phone numbers called by persons in the United States and the duration of 
the calls.54 After government officials brought overreaching to the 
attention of the FISC in 2009, intelligence analysts restricted queries to 
specific identifiers, such as phone numbers, that triggered a reasonable 
and articulable suspicion (RAS) of links to terrorism.55  
Second, even more importantly for this Article’s present discussion, 
Executive Order 12,333 (EO 12,333), enacted during the Reagan 
Administration, empowers the President, acting pursuant to a presidential 
finding, to order surveillance abroad.56 While the Executive Branch has 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign 
Content Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 13 (2014); see also Kris, supra note 51, 
at 235 (noting the government’s argument that “the telephony metadata must be available in bulk 
to allow NSA to identify the records of terrorist communications because without access to the 
larger haystack of data, it cannot find the needles using the much narrower querying process”). 
Relying on the third-party doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that government access to 
metadata, as opposed to content, does not pose a Fourth Amendment problem. See Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). That doctrine holds that individuals who voluntarily make 
information available to third parties, such as phone companies that need metadata to complete 
calls, have no reasonable expectation of privacy in such data. Id. at 743–44. But see SLOBOGIN, 
supra note 2, at 156–58 (criticizing the third-party doctrine); Jonathan Mayer, Patrick Mutchler 
& John C. Mitchell, Evaluating the privacy properties of telephone metadata, 113(20) 
PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5536 (May 17, 2016) (using digital research and probabilistic 
analysis to demonstrate that collection of metadata can have serious privacy consequences); cf. 
Robert S. Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age, 126 YALE L.J. F. 8, 13–16 (2016) 
(suggesting that courts should replace both third-party doctrine and “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test articulated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), with inquiry focusing on 
how government handles data and the data’s intended use).    
 55. Margulies, supra note 54, at 45–46; cf. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 104–05 (2016) (criticizing the 
program’s intrusiveness); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and 
Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 897–900 (2014) (criticizing the 
statutory and constitutional predicate for the program); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive 
Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 
1757–58 (2014) (suggesting that Congress’s authorization for the program may have been 
adequate under the applicable statute but arguing that courts should revive delegation theory to 
curb executive discretion over the program’s nature and scope).  
 56. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941–43 (Dec. 4, 1981). EO 12,333 mirrors 
provisions of the National Security Act that authorize covert action abroad based on a presidential 
finding. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (2012); Steven G. Bradbury, The Developing Legal Framework for 
Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 629, 640–41 (2011); cf. 
Amos Toh, Faiza Patel & Elizabeth Goitein, Overseas Surveillance in an Interconnected World, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/overseas-
surveillance-interconnected-world (expressing concern about intrusiveness of collection under EO 
 
15
Margulies: Surveillance By Algorithm: The NSA, Computerized Intelligence Col
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1060 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
historically been reticent about operations conducted under EO 12,333, 
the unprecedented openness ushered in by President Obama’s post-
Snowden January 2014 speech and the issuance of Presidential Policy 
Directive 28 (PPD-28)57 support the inference that the government 
engages in bulk collection of information abroad under an unspecified 
authority not linked to FISA, which after all permits only targeted 
collection. The most plausible inference from PPD-28 is that the authority 
for bulk collection abroad stems from EO 12,333.58  
Since the government defines “bulk” collection as the acquisition of 
data without the aid of “specific” selectors,59 it is reasonable to assume 
that bulk collection efforts overseas will have varying geographic and 
temporal parameters. For example, bulk collection might include using 
StingRay or comparable technology60 to collect all telephonic signals 
within a neighborhood near a U.S. embassy abroad for twenty-four hours 
because of otherwise unspecified reports of an imminent terrorist attack. 
At the other pole of collection efforts, reports indicate that the United 
States has collected in bulk the content of all telephonic traffic in 
Afghanistan, where the United States today is still engaged in an armed 
conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. To combat drug and human 
trafficking, U.S. government agencies also apparently collect the contents 
of mobile phone traffic in the Bahamas.61 In PPD-28, President Obama 
barred collection for particular purposes, such as suppressing speech 
critical of the United States, discriminating against racial, religious, or 
ethnic groups, or gaining a competitive advantage for U.S. companies.62  
  
                                                                                                                     
12,333). See generally Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the 
Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 539, 543 (2012) (providing background 
on the statutory authority for covert action).  
 57. See PPD-28, supra note 27, at sec. 2. 
 58. See PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 7 n.1 (defining bulk collection 
as the collection of “large quantities of SIGINT [signals intelligence] data that, because of 
technical or operational considerations, is acquired without the use . . . of specific identifiers or 
selection terms”).  
 59. Id. 
 60. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret 
Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on 
National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14–15, 34, 55–56 (2014) 
(describing StingRay as a portable device that gathers mobile phone signals within a relatively 
narrow area).  
 61. See Jacob Kastrenakes, The NSA Is Capturing Nearly Every Phone Call in Afghanistan, 
WikiLeaks Claims, VERGE (May 23, 2014, 9:41 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/23/57446 
16/nsa-capturing-nearly-all-afghanistan-phone-calls; Devereaux et al., supra note 11.  
 62. See PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 5–6. 
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss4/3
2016] SURVEILLANCE BY ALGORITHM 1061 
 
B.  Breaking Down Machine Searches 
Having established that states can collect data in a targeted or “bulk” 
fashion, this Article next considers how intelligence analysts search 
through data. Searches can be either directed or autonomous. A directed 
search sorts through data using keywords or other discrete pieces of data, 
such as phone numbers, email addresses, URLs, or Internet Protocol 
addresses.63 Analysts choose the “selectors” or “identifiers” used, and the 
machine then dutifully searches the data available.64 Autonomous 
searches are different. This Article uses the term autonomous to connote 
searches in which machines do not merely execute searches formulated 
by humans but instead engage in calculations that closely resemble 
human reasoning.65 Commercial firms engage in autonomous searches 
under the broad rubric of “data mining.”66 While there is no evidence that 
the government has engaged in data mining of domestically collected 
metadata,67 there are reasonable bases to infer that states, including the 
United States, use autonomous data mining techniques on transnational 
communications.68  
To see how autonomous learning works, consider a setting familiar to 
most lawyers: discovery.69 Suppose that plaintiffs had sued manufacturers 
of air bags used in cars, claiming that the air bags deployed 
                                                                                                                     
 63. See Kris, supra note 51, at 216. 
 64. See id. at 216–18. 
 65. The term autonomous has been used to describe technological advances such as self-
driving cars and computerized weapons systems that can operate independently of humans. See 
George R. Lucas, Jr., Automated Warfare, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 324 (2014). This Article 
adapts the term to the context of searches.   
 66. Danielle K. Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5, 26 (2014); see also SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 43 (listing 
AOL and Netflix as examples of commercial firms that engage in autonomous searches). 
 67. Querying domestic metadata without RAS-approved identifiers would violate FISC 
orders that govern domestic bulk collection. See Margulies, supra note 54, at 12–14.  
 68. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 
43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 447 (2008); Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet 
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 262–63 
(2008); see Bignami, supra note 21, at 633–34. 
 69. The case law on using autonomous searches to comply with electronic discovery 
obligations is growing rapidly. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 
251, 261–62 (D. Md. 2008); William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 
F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. Immigration & Customs 
Enf’t Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87, 109–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 
F.R.D. 182, 186–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further 
Thoughts on ‘Information Inflation’ and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search, RICH. J.L. & 
TECH., Spring 2011, paras. 18, 20–21; cf. John Didday, Informed Buyers of E-Discovery: Why 
General Counsel Must Become Tech Savvy, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 281, 306–07 (2013) 
(discussing the promise of advanced machine learning in e-discovery). 
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unpredictably, causing substantial injuries to passengers. Manufacturers 
had millions of documents on air bags, but only a relatively small 
number of documents were actually relevant to the plaintiffs’ claims. 
Inspection by human beings would be time-consuming and inefficient 
given the number of documents. A directed search using keywords 
would generate large numbers of errors. For example, a keyword search 
could generate an unmanageable number of false positives—documents 
that the search flagged as relevant, even though the documents were 
useless.70 Searching for a phrase such as “air bag” might yield thousands 
of documents dealing with the different consumer warranties applicable 
to the vehicle or labor relations in the factory that produced the item. 
By the same token, a keyword search could produce many false 
negatives—omitting documents because they did not fit the criteria 
humans had chosen, even though those documents were in fact highly 
relevant.71 For example, because of fear about litigation or regulatory 
action, the manufacturer’s employees might have coyly discussed air 
bag issues as “our problem” or “the question on the table.” Keyword 
searches are not effective at ferreting out code, vague terms with 
specific connotations, or other evasive or deceptive stratagems.72 
                                                                                                                     
 70. See Gregory L. Fordham, Using Keyword Search Terms in E-Discovery and How They 
Relate to Issues of Responsiveness, Privilege, Evidence Standards and Rube Goldberg, RICH. J.L. 
& TECH., Spring 2009, para. 10.  
 71. See Fordham, supra note 70, at para. 10; Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network, 877 F. 
Supp. 2d at 110.  
 72. Fourth Amendment cases on protocols for digital searches of laptops pursuant to 
lawfully obtained warrants are instructive on the deception that criminals use to hide their 
handiwork. See, e.g., United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 238–39 (3d Cir. 2011) (suggesting 
that law enforcement officials conducting digital searches pursuant to warrants need broad latitude 
to address deceptive tactics used by criminals in labeling and storing files); United States v. Mann, 
592 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing that “[u]nlike a physical object that can be 
immediately identified as responsive to the warrant or not, computer files may be manipulated to 
hide their true contents”); United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (declining to 
take a rigid approach to search protocols used to investigate a laptop covered by a warrant, 
pertaining to deceptive labeling of computer files); Wolf v. State, 266 P.3d 1169, 1173–75 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2011) (allowing an officer broad discretion to search a computer based on an affidavit 
describing that officer’s prior experience in child pornography investigations); cf. United States 
v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2013) (cautioning that judicial inclusion of detailed 
search protocols in warrants authorizing laptop searches may unduly constrain law enforcement 
efforts to unravel criminals’ deceptive data practices); Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the 
Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1123 (2009) 
(discussing the advantages of narrowly focused search protocols in laptop searches at U.S. border 
entry points). But see In re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1182 & n.23 
(Vt. 2012) (barring “sophisticated search techniques” beyond keyword searching absent specific 
evidence that the suspect had tried to hide laptop files); Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of 
Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241, 1255–58 (2010) (arguing that “[t]he search 
protocol must forbid the use of tools that would discover illegality relating to evidence outside 
the scope of the warrant”); see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 
1162, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (recommending that judges 
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Autonomous searches can do a far better job. 
An autonomous machine search will typically include four steps: 
training, testing, application, and validation.73 In the first step, a 
programmer will feed the machine data.74 In our air bag scenario, the 
programmer will find both relevant data, including data that would not 
show up on keyword searches, and irrelevant data. Feeding the machine 
sufficient data trains the machine on the patterns that distinguish relevant 
from irrelevant items.75 Programmers design the training process to 
enable the machine to search not only for documents that match those in 
the training set, but also for documents with patterns that are parallel or 
analogous.76 
In this space of analogous pattern detection, the machine exhibits a 
human capacity to draw inferences and craft analogies, along with the 
capacity to absorb and analyze vast amounts of data that far exceeds 
human abilities.77 To ascertain whether the machine has been properly 
trained, the programmer will test the machine on another data set.78 If the 
machine can properly generalize lessons from the training set and apply 
them to the data set, it passes the test.79 The machine is then put into 
operation. In the air bag scenario, the computer would analyze the vast 
trove of documents available to find patterns that matched those in the 
training set. Programmers would then validate the machine’s 
performance,80 perhaps by comparing the machine’s outputs to the results 
of a sample of documents inspected by humans. If error levels were 
adequate, the machine would be used again.81 If error levels were too 
high, programmers would either scrap the machine search or refine it.82  
Autonomous searches can be either supervised or unsupervised.83 The 
search described in the air bag scenario is a supervised search, in which 
programmers have certain objectives in mind and devise training and test 
sets to meet those objectives.84 In unsupervised searches, a machine 
                                                                                                                     
include specific methodological criteria in warrants for laptop searches). 
 73. STÉPHANE TUFFÉRY, DATA MINING AND STATISTICS FOR DECISION MAKING 304 (2011). 
 74. See id.  
 75. See id. at 305–08; Steven M. Bellovin et al., When Enough Is Enough: Location 
Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 556, 590–91 (2013).  
 76. See Bellovin et al., supra note 75, at 591.  
 77. See id. at 590–91. 
 78. See Lina Zhou et al., A Comparison of Classification Methods for Predicting Deception 
in Computer-Mediated Communication, 20 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 139, 152 (2004). 
 79. See TUFFÉRY, supra note 73, at 542.  
 80. See PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING 19 (2012); RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 
735; Bellovin et al., supra note 75, at 590–91 (2014). 
 81. See TUFFÉRY, supra note 73, at 542.  
 82. See id.  
 83. See Bellovin, supra note 75, at 591.  
 84. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 695. 
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might be given a massive amount of data, such as data from internet 
users’ search histories, and tasked to find patterns that linked individual 
users.85  
C.  The Search Deepens: Primary Machine Search Strategies  
Understanding autonomous searches and how they might work in 
national security intelligence collection requires more detail on the types 
of searches that machines can perform. These include decision trees, 
neural networks, and support vector machines. This Section briefly 
discusses each in turn.  
1.  To Tree or Not to Tree: Decision Trees and Machine Learning 
Decision trees are useful in making predictions and ascertaining 
causation. In preparing a decision tree, a machine analyzes the factors 
behind certain decisions or outcomes.86 A leaf in a decision tree 
represents a causal factor and identifies how examples with and without 
that attribute fared in achieving a particular outcome.87 A decision tree 
will deliver an output that is consistent with the rule of Ockham’s Razor: 
an explanation that is as simple as possible, given the data, with leaves 
pruned away if they were unnecessary for prediction.88 For example, a 
decision tree analyzing the Titanic shipwreck of 1912, in which almost 
1500 people died, would establish that out of the countless variables 
possessed by the passengers, gender and ticket class were the most 
significant determinants of survival.89 A decision tree modeling web-
surfers’ choices for reading online posts might suggest that visitors are 
more likely to read a post when the author is known, the thread is new, 
and the post is short.90 Decision trees that search for relevant documents 
in a large document database would consider the presence of certain 
words and word combinations.91 For example, a decision tree that 
identified documents on sophisticated financial transactions would look 
for the word “swap” and then determine if the document flagged also 
                                                                                                                     
 85. See FLACH, supra note 80, at 47. 
 86. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 698.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 696.  
 89. See TUFFÉRY, supra note 73, at 315–16. Gender was relevant because the Titanic’s 
captain ordered that women and children move first to the lifeboats on board. Titanic: ‘Iceberg 
Right Ahead,’ ULTIMATE TITANIC, http://www.ultimatetitanic.com/the-sinking/ (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2016). Ticket class was relevant because first class passengers had quarters closest to 
the ship’s main deck, where lifeboats were located. Id.  
 90. See 7.3.1 Learning Decision Trees, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: FOUND. OF 
COMPUTATIONAL AGENTS, http://artint.info/html/ArtInt_177.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).  
 91. See Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of 
Technology-Assisted Review, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2013).  
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contained the word “credit,” suggesting that the document discussed 
“credit-default swaps,” one kind of complex transaction.92  
A decision tree could also model what types of individuals abroad are 
most likely to become ISIS recruits.93 Some of the variables would be 
relatively obvious: the model would predict that recruits were more likely 
to be young, male, and Muslim. However, these factors do not hold true 
for all ISIS recruits94 or adequately separate that cohort from the far larger 
population of non-ISIS recruits. To find ISIS recruits, a decision tree 
might rely on other factors, such as employment history (to detect the 
disaffected or alienated), information from facial recognition software 
regarding attendance at events sponsored by radical clerics, search history 
data showing visits to violent extremist sites, and social media posts, 
texts, emails, or phone calls with known ISIS recruits.95  
2.  Machines and the Transparency Paradox: The Hidden Life of Neural 
Networks  
Artificial neural networks are more useful than decision trees in 
performing certain search or identification tasks. However, technological 
improvements are not a free lunch. The autonomous steps called “hidden 
layers” that enhance these searches’ utility come at transparency’s 
expense.  
a.  Artificial Neural Networks: Mimicking the Brain 
Artificial neural networks are useful for discerning patterns between 
individuals, groups, and objects or behaviors.96 Neural networks are 
software applications that mimic the functioning of the human brain.97 
The human brain works through neurons, which are the fundamental 
functional unit of the nervous system.98 Fibers called dendrites branch out 
                                                                                                                     
 92. See id.  
 93. Professor Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, Google’s Director of Research, model a 
more everyday, lower-stakes decision: whether to wait for a table at a crowded restaurant. 
RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 698 (discussing the importance of common-sense factors 
such as alternative restaurants, price, hunger, and estimated wait). The authors use this example 
because of its familiarity. Their broader point, however, is that decision trees can also be a useful 
strategy for more complex decisions. See id.  
 94. See Katrin Bennhold, Religion Meets Rebellion: How ISIS Lured 3 Friends, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 18, 2015, at A1 (describing ISIS’s recruitment of three teenage girls in Britain). 
 95. A directed search using identifiers could pinpoint contacts of known ISIS operatives; 
programmers could then integrate these outputs with an autonomous search looking for fresh 
patterns. 
 96. Michael Aikenhead, The Uses and Abuses of Neural Networks in Law, 12 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 35–36 (1996). 
 97. Id. at 32; see RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 728. 
 98. See Aikenhead, supra note 96, at 34–35. 
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from each neuron to others, as does a long fiber called the axon.99 The 
interchange between neurons is called a synapse.100 As in the human 
brain, neurons in an artificial network are interconnected but distinct, 
enabling the neurons to break down complex problems into more 
manageable component parts.101  
In the human brain, all neurons fire at the same time—all neurons in 
the human brain simultaneously send signals.102 Some signals might 
transmit visual or auditory cues, while others may transmit bits of context 
and memory.103 This simultaneous firing allows the human brain to 
readily perform certain tasks, such as distinguishing between two small, 
red, round, and organic objects, one of which is an apple and the other a 
tomato. In contrast, even complex software that seeks to mimic the 
human brain will generally not allow all artificial neurons in a network to 
fire at once. For that reason, using neural networks for visual pattern 
recognition is a sophisticated task, albeit one which has seen remarkable 
progress.  
i.  Training Neural Networks 
Neural networks use inductive learning algorithms that allow a 
machine to draw inferences based on massive amounts of data.104 One 
builds a neural network by deciding how many nodes or units are required 
for a task, how to connect those nodes, and how to initialize the synaptic 
“weights” that comprise a neural network’s primary means of long-term 
storage.105 As with any form of machine learning, neural networks are 
first trained with examples that the network digests with the aid of a 
learning algorithm.106 Certain types of neural networks can then generate 
outputs that find patterns between a new stimulus and data in the training 
set.107 For example, suppose the training set for the neural network 
consists of photos of suspected terrorists. Suppose further that the 
network receives a new stimulus in the form of a small piece of one photo 
from the training set. The network will readily reproduce the entire photo, 
including that small piece.108  
                                                                                                                     
 99. Id.  
 100. See id.  
 101. WITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 232–33. 
 102. Neurons and Their Jobs, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, https://www.nia.nih.gov/alzheimers/
publication/part-1-basics-healthy-brain/neurons-and-their-jobs (last updated Jan. 22, 2015).   
 103. Id.  
 104. See Aikenhead, supra note 96, at 34.  
 105. See WITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 235; Aikenhead, supra note 96, at 35.  
 106. See Aikenhead, supra note 96, at 35.  
 107. See id. at 35–36, 36 n.11. 
 108. See, e.g., Human Face Recognition Found in Neural Networks Based on Monkey 
Brains, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/535176/
human-face-recognition-found-in-neural-network-based-on-monkey-brains/ (explaining how 
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Neural networks connect inputs and outputs through hidden layers.109 
Software engineers use multiple hidden layers because breaking down 
the sorting of data into multiple steps allows greater precision than one-
step sorting. Each layer performs a function that sorts out data from the 
previous step.110  
Consider how a neural network performs facial recognition—
detecting faces in a massive number of video images.111 Facial 
recognition software breaks up that task, first searching for facial 
features, such as eyes and noses. To detect eyes, software engineers will 
use at least three hidden layers, each trained with image data.112 The first 
layer will search for short edges in an image.113 Eyes have short edges 
compared to larger inanimate or inorganic objects, such as buildings or 
trucks. However, another layer is necessary to categorize the particular 
                                                                                                                     
scientists have created a neural network based on a monkey’s brain that is able to recognize faces 
and then match the face to an identity).  
 109. Zhou et al., supra note 78, at 149–50. 
 110. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 729. Hidden layers are also a feature of 
another machine learning technique, support vector machines (SVMs). See WITTEN, ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 191–92. One virtue of SVMs is that they deal effectively with data that has many 
variables, and therefore many “dimensions” that an SVM can plot in space, using hyperplanes 
that cleanly separate disparate groups. Id. at 223–25. Linear modes of data analysis such as graphs 
can only plot two variables at a time, including the intersection of mass and acceleration to 
compute force or age and education to help predict an individual’s likelihood of voting. Id. In 
contrast, the hyperplanes derived by SVMs can separate groups along twenty or more variables. 
Id. Using hidden layers, SVMs discern relationships between variables that humans would miss.  
To illustrate how an SVM could aid in counterterrorism, consider the identification of ISIS 
recruits through the relationship of a large number of variables, each of which alone might be 
useless. For example, ISIS recruits might cite particular commentaries or interpretations of sacred 
texts as authorizing violence. In addition, ISIS recruits might refer to such religious commentaries 
or to operational and logistical details using code. A directed search would find only codes already 
known to government officials. In contrast, a SVM could also find uses of language that were 
analogous to known codes in syntax, frequency of word choice, and similar factors. The SVM 
might detect new codes by grouping the incidence of certain word choices with other individual 
behaviors, such as frequent visiting of chat rooms advocating violent extremism, use of specific 
kinds of encryption, or patronage of stores selling burner phones. In this fashion, ISIS recruits that 
would escape detection by humans, directed searches, or other autonomous searches would “pop” 
in SVM outputs.  
 111. See, e.g., Human Face Recognition Found in Neural Network Based on Monkey Brains, 
supra note 108. Use of facial recognition technology in either the domestic or transnational 
context requires safeguards; for example, no state should use such technology to identify or target 
political opponents. See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and 
Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 545–
48 (2012).  
 112. See, e.g., Human Face Recognition Found in Neural Network Based on Monkey Brains, 
supra note 108.  
 113. Id.  
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short edge detected in the first layer.114 Depending on the perspective in 
an image, a short edge could be part of an eye or part of a large inanimate 
object, such as a truck, building, or rock formation, whose image had 
short edges because it happened to be far away from the camera. This 
second layer distinguishes between short edges that fit together in the 
distinctive oval pattern typical of eyes and images in a more straight-
edged pattern that might indicate the presence of a distant inanimate 
object.115 This layer is “hidden” because software engineers do not 
impose specific quantitative parameters on the machine in this layer. 
Instead, they feed the machine enough images to train the computer to 
recognize distinctions between eyes and inanimate objects.116 A third 
layer could search for a particular kind of face or even the face of an 
individual.117  
ii.  Neural Networks and the Transparency Paradox 
Hidden layers create a trade-off in machine learning. Given sufficient 
data to sort through, hidden layers that rely on autonomous learning can 
be extraordinarily accurate, yielding more true positives and fewer false 
positives than directed searches.118 For example, a neural network with 
hidden layers and a robotic arm can, given enough tries, learn to pick up 
a ball as it generalizes from information that is available about the weight 
and size of the ball and other factors.119 This task is elementary to humans 
but actually involves a significant number of discrete steps. Combining 
the ability to learn with the ability to absorb huge amounts of data, a 
                                                                                                                     
 114. See id.  
 115. See id.  
 116. See Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey 
of Policy and Implementation Issues 17–18 (Lancaster Univ. Mgmt. Sch., Working Paper No. 
2010/030, 2010), http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/49012/1/Document.pdf. Another layer might perform 
a similar operation to detect composed edges typical of the human nose. A further layer would 
combine this search with the search for eyes. Similar image data can also train machines to 
recognize other elements of human anatomy, such as arms and legs.   
 117. My goal here is to concisely explain how hidden layers work, not to explore the latest 
developments in the fluid field of facial recognition, including the detection of individual faces. 
For a discussion of recent developments, see Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 116, at 16–18; 
Kirill Levashov, Note, The Rise of a New Type of Surveillance for Which the Law Wasn’t Ready, 
15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 164, 167–70 (2013).  
 118. The benefit of hidden layers is the networks’ greater capacity to learn autonomously, 
compared with other machines such as decision trees. A machine that learns autonomously with 
a large amount of data will typically outperform a machine with less data, even when the second 
machine has been programmed with a workable algorithm. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 
17, at 756–57. 
 119. Dana S. Rao, Note, Neural Networks: Here, There, and Everywhere—An Examination 
of Available Intellectual Property Protection for Neural Networks in Europe and the United 
States, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 509, 512–13 (1996–1997). 
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neural network can also autonomously discern patterns in photographs, 
voice recordings, or other types of data120 with a level of efficiency that 
no human could possibly match. However, the superior accuracy of such 
autonomous layers comes at the cost of humans’ ability to substantively 
explain the inferential reasoning that occurs in each layer.121 Since the 
hidden layer’s search is autonomous, not directed, the human analyst 
cannot cite specific parameters that the analyst programs into the 
machine.122 As noted, the analyst refrains from imposing such parameters 
because they would yield results that are less accurate.123  
In the absence of a substantive explanation, the analyst can only offer 
a methodological explanation: the network’s hidden layers have searched 
for patterns that distinguish most accurately between human eyes and 
other image components.124 An analyst can also describe how she has 
validated the autonomous machine search’s results.125 The law governing 
searches must decide if machine learning’s validated accuracy, 
accompanied by a methodological explanation, outweighs the lack of a 
specific, articulable substantive explanation.  
The contrast between substantive and methodological explanations of 
machine searches becomes most salient in searches designed to predict 
human conduct, including criminality or terrorism. To satisfy U.S. 
statutory or constitutional requirements, a government official would 
                                                                                                                     
 120. See Dave Gershgorn, These Are What the Google Artificial Intelligence’s Dreams Look 
Like, POPULAR SCIENCE (June 19, 2015), http://www.popsci.com/these-are-what-google-
artificial-intelligences-dreams-look (explaining Google’s approach to teaching an artificial 
neutral network what a fork is).  
 121. See Zhou et al., supra note 78, at 150–51; Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, 
Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 906 (2016). 
 122. See Zhou et al., supra note 78, at 150–51 (explaining that because of hidden layers’ role 
in connecting inputs and outputs, which gives neural networks a “highly nonlinear structure,” 
there is no definitive way “to easily interpret the relative strength of each input to each output in 
the network”). This confluence of accuracy and difficulty in substantive explanation is not 
confined to machines. It extends to other nonhuman search aids. For example, drug-sniffing dogs 
are often extraordinarily accurate in detecting traces of contraband. Humans, whose sense of smell 
is laughably crude by comparison, lack any detailed substantive or scientific explanation of the 
physiology behind dogs’ uncanny olfactory accuracy. See Rich, supra note 121, at 911–12. A 
warrant application or a legal justification of a warrantless search based on a drug-sniffing dog’s 
reaction will not try to quantitatively classify a smell as so many parts per million. Instead, the 
legal justification will be methodological in nature. The justification will describe the dog’s 
reaction, on the theory that the canine reaction alone is sufficient demonstration of the presence 
of drugs. A methodological explanation is sufficient based on validated scientific techniques that 
using dogs works.  
 123. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1519–20 (noting 
that in many cases using only techniques that would permit a substantive, verbal explanation of 
the machine’s calculations would reduce the accuracy of the search). 
 124. See id.  
 125. See id. at 1520.  
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generally need to present substantive reasons in favor of a warrant.126 
Authorization for a search would depend on probable cause or a 
reasonable suspicion that the subject of a search had committed or was in 
the process of conspiring to commit a specific criminal act.127 For 
example, the government might seek to show that an individual was 
conspiring to provide material support, including money, arms, or more 
intangible assistance, to ISIS or another foreign terrorist group.128 The 
warrant application would include specific substantive information 
bolstering this conclusion, such as a conversation between the subject and 
a government informant.  
In contrast, an autonomous machine search for ISIS recruits would 
typically not yield such a substantive justification. Instead, an 
autonomous search—even one of publicly available databases not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment—would find patterns that might 
include an individual’s opinions, associations, and types of behavior. 
Given enough data, an autonomous search could infer a reasonable risk 
that a given individual was an ISIS recruit based on myriad patterns that 
might include expressions of political opinion in chat rooms, a recent 
report of a lost passport (indicating an attempt to conceal a visit to a 
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan or Pakistan), attempts to use or 
deploy a common encryption technique, and patronage (picked up 
through public video surveillance and facial recognition software) of a 
store specializing in pre-paid cell phones.129 This convergence of 
variables might be predictive of terrorist activity but would likely not in 
itself be sufficient to satisfy the U.S. Constitution’s probable cause 
standard.130  
  
                                                                                                                     
 126. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972). 
 127. Cf. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring showing 
of probable cause to obtain the contents of emails); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 505 
(11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that locational data was available upon individualized 
statutory showing, requiring “specific and articulable facts showing reasonable grounds to believe 
the records [or other information sought] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation,” while noting that this statutory showing was less rigorous than probable cause). 
 128. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
1, 8 (2010) (upholding the constitutionality of material support statute against vagueness and First 
Amendment challenges); Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, 
and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455, 486–93 (2012) (defending the Humanitarian Law 
Project’s decision that upheld limits on active relationships with foreign terrorist groups, based 
in part on the difficulty of gaining information about such groups’ activities abroad).  
 129. Let us suppose that either the machine or a human analyst assessing search results would 
also apply a test for false positives, such as information that a particular individual flagged by the 
search was a lawyer, journalist, academic, or human rights researcher. 
 130. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983) (holding that probable cause is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place).  
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Moreover, in an unsupervised learning mode, the machine would use 
hidden layers to analyze multiple variables.131 Because of the number of 
variables that the hidden layers crunched, an analyst would not be able to 
retrieve a substantive, verbal explanation of how those variables 
interacted to generate a particular result. Indeed, assuming enough 
inputted data, the machine’s search would be valuable precisely to the 
extent that it detected patterns that would have eluded a human analyst. 
Even then, however, a definitive conclusion about a positive result from 
a particular machine search would benefit from follow-up investigation 
by counterterrorism officials.132 Moreover, for every “true positive”—a 
bona fide ISIS recruit—identified through such follow-up, several false 
positives might emerge: individuals flagged by the machine search who 
were in fact not ISIS recruits.  
In this scenario, a paradox emerges. Let us take the best-case scenario 
in which a follow-up investigation identifies otherwise undetected ISIS 
recruits, with a minimal number of false positives. Let us assume that a 
machine search of this type will yield results that are superior to sole 
reliance on either human intelligence or a directed search using contacts 
of known terrorists. Human access to the search results might still be 
arbitrary under international human rights law, if one defined a non-
arbitrary search as one entailing a substantive verbal explanation of the 
factors giving rise to the search. After all, as previously noted, the 
machine search’s hidden layers would preclude just such a substantive 
verbal explanation. However, finding human access to such search results 
to be arbitrary would create an anomaly: less accurate results, such as 
those based on the assertions of an informant with an axe to grind, would 
comply with human rights norms, while more accurate results would not. 
This Article resolves the transparency paradox in Part V; the goal here is 
to simply flag the problem.  
D.  The Accuracy of Machine Learning as a Counterterrorism Tool  
The discussion above regarding the accuracy of certain machine 
learning techniques raises an issue that is as hotly debated as any in the 
study of counterterrorism surveillance law and policy: the accuracy of 
machine learning in the national security space.133 Privacy advocates, 
including those with significant technical expertise, claim that machine 
learning in this context is ineffective because data is insufficient—the 
needles are too small and the haystack too large.134 As this Article shows 
                                                                                                                     
 131. See supra notes 109–17 and accompanying text.  
 132. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 206. 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 207–09 (highlighting policy makers’ decision-making strategies when 
evaluating the “trade off” between privacy and accuracy in data mining).  
 134. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 136–38 (quoting former NSA Director General 
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below, however, critics of counterterrorism machine searches sometimes 
skew the definitions of outputs to reinforce their arguments. Other 
technologists, however, while acknowledging the difficulties of machine 
searches in this context, also concede that these searches could have 
“substantial benefits.”135 If one believes that technology improves 
exponentially over time, this latter view provides the basis for cautious 
optimism about the role of national security machine searches.  
Any candid analysis of machine learning in counterterrorism must 
acknowledge a crucial problem: to be effective, machine searches need 
data to compare and analyze. Terrorism, although a huge problem with 
devastating consequences, is relatively rare.136 Terrorists do not need to 
command the allegiance of the majority of the population to have an 
impact; if they did, ISIS, which probably has no more than 30,000 armed 
fighters,137 would be a paltry force in the Middle East, which is home to 
more than 200 million people.138 Since, by any count, terrorists are 
relatively rare, mobilizing the data to input into machines is a major 
challenge.139  
If data is insufficient, machine searches are likely to “overfit” the 
training data.140 That is, a machine will simply “memorize” the 
characteristics of known terrorists, including those that are irrelevant to 
the subject’s terrorist status.141 When a sample is large, irrelevant 
characteristics will likely be evenly distributed among true positives and 
negatives. However, when the sample is small, chance may create a spike 
in certain irrelevant factors. For example, in a small sample, a 
disproportionate number of individuals labeled as positives might have a 
common birthday or might be left-handed. These attributes clearly have 
no bearing on whether the individual is an ISIS recruit. A machine might 
“overfit” its training data, however, by treating such irrelevant factors as 
                                                                                                                     
Keith Alexander arguing that “you need the haystack to find the needle”); see also NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 13 (noting that a massive amount of 
data must be analyzed to distinguish between terrorist activities and legitimate ones, and that 
innocent people’s data will be collected, resulting in a privacy issue).  
 135. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 196. 
 136. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 137.  
 137. See Jim Michaels, New U.S. Intelligence Estimate Sees 20-25K ISIL Fighters, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 4, 2016, 5:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/02/03/isil-
fighters-new-estimate-25000-iraq-syria/79775676/.  
 138. See Population: Middle East, INDEX MUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/map/?
v=21&r=me&l=en (last visited Mar. 25, 2016). 
 139. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 136–38. 
 140. FLACH, supra note 80, at 6; RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 709, 736; WITTEN ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 18–19, 29. 
 141. Cf. FLACH, supra note 80, at 6 (explaining a phenomenon called overfitting, where a 
machine will learn all the characteristics of past information but cannot generalize it to new, future 
information).  
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part of its working hypothesis for predicting terrorist status. That would 
make the hypothesis a poor basis for generalizing about the presence of 
terrorism in a larger population. Programmers can address overfitting, but 
in the absence of enough data, a machine still lacks the ingredients for an 
accurate search. For the most ardent critics of surveillance, this problem 
is insurmountable.142  
While the surveillance critics raise strong points, particularly on the 
effect of data on accuracy,143 their arguments are less persuasive than they 
might appear. First, machine searches could be very effective at 
pinpointing confluences of facts that suggest terrorist plots, such as 
contact between an individual that facial recognition technology showed 
was taking photographs of New York City landmarks and another 
individual buying large quantities of explosives.144 Moreover, the critics 
stack the deck when they posit that a machine search must uncover 
imminent attacks to be considered effective.145 The critics are right that 
imminent attacks are rare, once one leaves sites of armed conflict such as 
Afghanistan. However, in a conflict zone, attacks are more frequent. The 
United States and other states have a legitimate interest in detecting 
planned attacks in conflict zones.146 In addition, the thousands of ISIS 
recruits that have traveled or conspired to travel to the Middle East147 are 
a more substantial group than the isolated ring of conspirators that 
surveillance critics posit. Fortunately, the number of ISIS recruits does 
not approach the numbers of Amazon customers or Gmail users that 
private firms mine.148 However, the cohort of active ISIS recruits may be 
big enough to provide generalizable data. Indeed, ISIS’s reliance on 
social media149 may actually make its adherents more like the commercial 
internet users that private firms mine for purchasing habits. As 
surveillance critics concede, data mining is good at finding mutual tastes 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 139 (asserting that the problems with data mining 
for terrorists “cannot be fixed”). 
 143. Cf. Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. 
REV. 773, 812–16 (2015) (discussing the application of the Daubert test on scientific evidence to 
validate machine searching techniques). 
 144. See PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM 232–33 (2015) (noting that machine 
searches of contacts and records can uncover patterns of criminal activity, even when specific 
data points seems “innocent enough in isolation”). 
 145. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 138. 
 146. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 115.  
 147. Eric Schmitt & Somini Sengupta, Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite Global 
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/middleeast/
thousands-enter-syria-to-join-isis-despite-global-efforts.html?.  
 148. See Sean Madden, How Companies Like Amazon Use Big Data to Make You Love 
Them, FAST COMPANY (May 2, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.fastcodesign.com/1669551/how-
companies-like-amazon-use-big-data-to-make-you-love-them; Gibbs, supra note 42.  
 149. Schmitt & Sengupta, supra note 147.  
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and detecting joint participation in events.150 Keeping track of who 
attends ISIS’s virtual recruitment fairs may in fact play to machine 
searches’ strengths. 
In addition, if the actual data set of ISIS recruits is still not large 
enough, that does not necessarily mean that counterterrorism officials 
must write off data mining. Creative programmers can find work-
arounds, including populating a data set with “synthetic” data: virtual 
replicas of actual terrorists that can augment sample size and permit 
rudimentary validation of a machine search.151  
Moreover, the experience of the government thus far reinforces the 
case for cautious optimism about machine searches. While some 
programs have ended in futility, some specialized government data 
mining programs, such as those focused on fraud, have established a 
niche.152 The government’s USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act) metadata 
program, although it did not catch any terrorists on the brink of an attack, 
supplied a useful lead in an investigation of a plot to bomb New York 
subways.153  
Finally, the trove of documents leaked by Edward Snowden, which 
one would assume are “Exhibit A” for surveillance critics, in fact suggest 
that machine learning may be helpful.154 Consider the targeted 
surveillance reports on conversations between an Australian, who wished 
to join the Taliban, and his girlfriend.155 While critics claim that the 
girlfriend was a false positive, her conversations with her aspiring 
Taliban-member boyfriend reveal his deepening radicalization and the 
streak of male control fixation that accompanied it.156 That window into 
the Australian’s motives, which might generalize to other terrorist 
recruits, reinforces the value of overseas intelligence collection. True, it 
appears that the conversations between the aspiring Taliban and his 
                                                                                                                     
 150. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 140 (finding that “political dissidents are likely to share a 
well-defined profile”).  
 151. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 81. 
 152. Id. at 235–36. 
 153. See Margulies, supra note 54, at 15. The metadata program first supplied this lead, 
although it might have been available from other sources. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES 
OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 
215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 150 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on 
_the_ Telephone_Records_Program.pdf.  
 154. See id. at 1.  
 155. Barton Gellman et al., In NSA-Intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber 
the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-
are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html. 
 156. Id.  
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girlfriend were collected as part of the targeted Section 702 program,157 
not an autonomous search. However, it seems reasonable to assume that 
some of the selectors used in the Section 702 program, which largely 
belong to persons outside the United States, first came to light through 
autonomous search techniques.  
II.  MACHINE VERSUS HUMAN ACCESS TO DATA 
Now with a basic grasp of how machine searches work, this Article 
can address a normative question: how intrusive are machine searches? 
Surveillance critics state two normative objections to machine access to 
data. The deontological objection frames privacy as a right that inherently 
protects the individual against all manner of intrusions, whether by 
people or machines.158 In contrast, the consequentialist objection cites the 
risk that governments, corporations, or other individuals will misuse 
personal information.159 Champions of a state-centric approach discount 
the deontological implications of computer access and the risks of 
adverse consequences.160 In contrast, government critics and privacy 
advocates argue that under either a deontological or consequentialist 
reading, machine and individual access pose risks of equivalent severity. 
This Article argues for a middle ground that recognizes that, while 
machine access poses both deontological and consequentialist risks, 
appropriate safeguards can address these concerns. 
A.  The Deontological Objection to Machine Access 
Many privacy advocates’ arguments suggest that machine access 
violates central aspects of personhood. Professor Julie Cohen, for 
example, has written that pervasive machine access by private sector 
firms tracking individuals’ internet use intrudes on humans’ sense of 
control and self.161 According to Professor Cohen, certain types of 
                                                                                                                     
 157. Id. 
 158. While the deontological view is an important touchstone in thinking about privacy, 
many contemporary legal scholars deal with either direct or more intangible consequences of 
privacy intrusions. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1909–
10 (2013) (discussing theories of the self, while also linking privacy with participation in 
democratic governance); cf. SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 94–95 (surveying research suggesting 
individual’s knowledge of ubiquitous surveillance may limit spontaneity). But see Daniel J. 
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1145 & nn. 342–44 (2002) (citing 
sources while rejecting the deontological view). 
 159. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 
1945–47, 1951 (2013) (discussing the importance of privacy in the ability to think freely without 
government intimidation); Solove, supra note 158, at 1151 (arguing that protecting privacy 
prevents “exercises of power employed to destroy or injure individuals”).   
 160. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 9, at 249–51. 
 161. Cohen, supra note 158, at 1910–11, 1916–17 (discussing spontaneity and play in the 
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machine access, such as scanning email to tailor behavioral advertising 
to individual users, inhibit individuals’ capacity to develop their own 
values and preferences through trial and error.162 Burdened by the 
awareness that machines are monitoring the content of their 
communications, individuals will be less spontaneous—less willing to 
make mistakes.163 If the freedom to make mistakes is an essential 
ingredient of personal autonomy, then for Professor Cohen machine 
access abridges that autonomy.  
A state-centric account would take the opposite tack. On this view, 
machine access alone, uncoupled from human access, has no 
deontological privacy implications.164 This view holds that only beings 
with a certain level of consciousness can intrude on privacy.165 Forms of 
life such as animals lack consciousness in the human sense and therefore 
cannot intrude. No one regards a dog or cat as intruding on his privacy, 
even if it saw him without clothes.166 A computer, on this reading, is 
similarly unintrusive, as long as it is uncoupled from human access.167  
Intuitions about privacy do not entirely square with the deontological 
objection to machine surveillance. Most privacy advocates rely, either 
expressly or implicitly, on the metaphor of the “gaze.” Professor Jeffrey 
Rosen, for example, in his groundbreaking work, The Unwanted Gaze, 
repeatedly uses examples of privacy intrusions such as the public 
disclosures of Monica Lewinsky’s sexual history with then-President Bill 
Clinton168 and the disclosures of individuals’ sexual histories and 
communications in sexual harassment litigation.169 In each of these 
instances, the intrusion on privacy arose from the knowledge acquired by 
other people and the prospect of others’ amusement, pity, or disdain.  
That said, the state-centric dismissal of the equivalency theory also is 
too facile. While one cannot fully quantify or predict the costs to self of 
ubiquitous machine access, it seems reasonable to assume that such 
                                                                                                                     
development of selfhood, and suggesting that systematic intrusions by the government and 
corporations adversely affects such development). 
 162. Id. at 1916–18. 
 163. Id.  
 164. See Posner, supra note 9, at 254.  
 165. See id.  
 166. Ross Andersen, An Eye Without an ‘I’: Justice and the Rise of Automated Surveillance, 
ATLANTIC (June 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/06/an-eye-
without-an-i-justice-and-the-rise-of-automated-surveillance/258082/. 
 167. Dan Froomkin, The Computers Are Listening: How the NSA Converts Spoken Words 
Into Searchable Text, INTERCEPT (May 5, 2015, 10:08 AM), https://firstlook.org/
theintercept/2015/05/05/nsa-speech-recognition-snowden-searchable-text/ (quoting Kim 
Taipale, Stilwell Center for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy, as noting that 
“[a]utomated analysis has different privacy implications” than access to data by human analysts).  
 168. JEFFREY ROSEN, UNWANTED GAZE 4–6, 8 (2000).  
 169. Id. at 88–94. 
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comprehensive surveillance would make people more wary of making 
mistakes. That reticence would lead to less experimentation and perhaps 
less personal growth. Universal machine access might also induce an 
anxiety that undermined personal well-being, even when more tangible 
indicia of welfare showed improvement.  
In addition, the deontological objection to full machine access may 
reflect developments in artificial intelligence that have brought 
computers closer to human beings. It is unlikely that computers possess 
even the consciousness and affective attributes, such as anger or fear, 
attributable to household pets. However, every day researchers add to the 
repertoire of judgments that computers can make. It is now routine to 
subject machines performing searches or other autonomous activities to 
penalties for exceeding certain parameters and to reward machines for 
good performance.170 Those penalties and rewards may not produce 
emotions such as guilt or shame, but they indicate that computers can 
respond to stimuli. Indeed, the extraordinary progress in machine 
learning over the past few decades has far exceeded humans’ ability to 
change. If providing information to an entity that can process that data in 
a sophisticated fashion instills perceptions of loss of control, machine 
access may undermine perceptions of control far more readily than access 
by other humans, let alone dogs or cats.  
B.  The Consequentialist Objection 
Machine access also draws consequentialist objections. For example, 
machines may be largely responsible for implementing certain 
counterterrorism tools, including no-fly lists.171 These lists have a 
significant number of errors, including both false positives and false 
negatives.172 Inclusion on a no-fly list can hamper individuals’ ability to 
travel to the United States and possibly to other countries. Because 
officials may overestimate a machine’s accuracy,173 they rarely remove 
individuals from such lists.174 When hidden layers reduce the 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See FLACH, supra note 80, at 131 (discussing the use of a penalty for a machine that set 
predictive criteria that were too complex to efficiently generalize to future cases). 
 171. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 214.  
172.The late Senator Ted Kennedy was sometimes delayed in boarding because his name 
matched one on the list. See PETER MARGULIES, LAW’S DETOUR: JUSTICE DISPLACED IN THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 44–45 (2010). Errors in the no-fly list have attracted greater attention after the 
June 2016 ISIS-inspired mass shooting at an Orlando nightclub because of legislative proposals 
to bar those on the list from buying guns. See Molly O’Toole & Paul McLeary, Here’s How 
Terrorism is Scrambling America’s Gun Debate, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 21, 2016), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/21/heres-how-terrorism-is-scrambling-americas-gun-debate/. 
 173. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 206. 
 174. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1161 (D. Or. 2014) (holding that the 
Department of Homeland Security’s process for correcting the erroneous placement of travelers 
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transparency of machine outputs, these problems multiply. While such 
searches can be more accurate than other types, flaws in inputted data 
will compromise outputs.175 Some of these concerns are best addressed 
through a robust framework for correcting errors.176 Nevertheless, such 
concerns reinforce the consequentialist objection to machine access. 
Errors in machine searches may prompt further harms. For example, 
states might detain individuals because of outputs from machine searches. 
Prolonged detention based solely on a machine search would be arbitrary 
and hence a violation of the ICCPR. An individual could also be subject 
to counterterrorism sanctions because of a flawed search.177 In addition, 
flawed search results could affect targeting decisions by states engaged 
in armed conflicts with violent extremists. In a provocative and 
intentionally hyperbolic remark, former NSA (and CIA) Director General 
Michael Hayden asserted, “We kill people based on metadata.”178 In fact, 
the process used by the United States for targeted killings is far more 
                                                                                                                     
on the no-fly list left them stranded on the list indefinitely and violated their procedural due 
process rights); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 929–31 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(same); Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J. 
(forthcoming 2016) (discussing litigation over no-fly lists and finding that “[w]hile people like 
Ted Kennedy did not remain on the no-fly list for long, less connected individuals like Rahinah 
Ibrahim and many others were not so lucky, receiving recourse after many years, if at all”); cf. 
Abdelfattah v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 529–43 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (detailing lawful 
resident plaintiff’s difficulties with repeated security checks that information in government 
databases may have prompted and holding that plaintiff could seek relief under both the Privacy 
Act and the U.S. Constitution, but denying relief because the plaintiff had not established a factual 
basis, including tangible harm, for the relief sought). 
 175. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 76 (discussing errors 
when machine searches inspect multiple databases, each of which may have incorrect inputs). 
 176. Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 804, 810 (2007). The government has established a program to directly handle 
complaints about difficulties in boarding aircraft that may be due to erroneous inclusion on a 
terrorist watch list. See DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-trip. Recently, the government 
expanded the information it would provide to travelers who encountered such difficulties. See 
Dibya Sarkar, Justice Department Revises Procedures for Individuals on No-Fly List Seeking 
Redress, FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/justi 
ce-department-revises-procedures-individuals-no-fly-list-seeking-redre/2015-04-16. A program 
like DHS TRIP is a useful supplement to, but not a substitute for, a program that would address 
complaints about wrongful data collection and retention. Wrongful collection or retention or flawed 
data inputs that conflate an innocent with a terrorist can manifest themselves in a range of harms; 
difficulty in boarding an aircraft is just one of them. In such cases, it is more effective to address 
the problem at the source. The DHS TRIP program shows that such redress is feasible. 
 177. See Peter Margulies, Aftermath of an Unwise Decision: The U.N. Terrorist Sanctions 
Regime After Kadi II, 6 AMSTERDAM L.F. 51, 52–53 (2014). 
 178. Lee Ferran, Ex-NSA Chief: ‘We Kill People Based on Metadata,’ ABC NEWS 
(May 12, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-kill-people-
based-on-metadata/. 
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diligent, methodical, and comprehensive than the general’s off-hand 
remark suggested.179 Despite concerns about autonomous weapons, no 
one claims that the United States or any other state targets individuals 
based solely on a machine search. That said, if flawed machine outputs 
play a role because individual officials are unwilling or unable to follow 
up, that deficit should also figure in the consequentialist calculus.  
In sum, while surveillance critics overstate the force of the 
deontological objection to machine access, this objection cannot be 
completely dismissed. Similarly, consequentialist objections to machine 
surveillance have some foundation. This does not mean that human rights 
law should preclude machine surveillance or treat it as equivalent to 
human access in all contexts. However, the risk of deontological and 
consequential harms points toward the need for safeguards.   
III.  AGAINST THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE: STATE CAPABILITIES 
NEED NOT DRIVE MACHINE SEARCH PRACTICES 
With the above discussion as a predicate, this Article now examines 
the flaws in the second equivalency proposition, which this Article calls 
the technological imperative: the descriptive claim that in matters of 
surveillance, a state’s capabilities determine its practices.180 Viewed in a 
more modest light, this claim is sound; indeed, in a speech announcing 
reforms in overseas intelligence collection, President Obama 
acknowledged the “inevitable bias [in government] . . . to collect more 
information about the world, not less.”181 However, as an ironclad 
prediction about state practice, the technological imperative fails to 
deliver because it unduly discounts technological, legal, and political 
constraints on democratic governments.  
The technological imperative reflects an incomplete acknowledgment 
of technology’s role in privacy matters. While privacy advocates often 
view increasing technological sophistication solely as a threat to privacy, 
this perspective is too limiting. Technological advances such as search 
filters can preserve privacy by regulating government surveillance 
                                                                                                                     
 179. Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 685 (2014) 
(concluding based on document review and interviews that U.S. targeting decisions involved 
elaborate analysis engaged in by dozens or even hundreds of officials); cf. Ferran, supra note 178 
(indicating that General Hayden did not make his remarks about metadata in the course of 
describing U.S. targeted killing procedures but instead highlighted that the Patriot Act domestic 
metadata program required directed searches based on identifiers linked to terrorism and did not 
allow autonomous machine searches). 
 180. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 181. Transcript of President Obama’s Jan 17 Speech on NSA Reforms, WASH. POST (Jan. 
17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17-speech 
-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.  
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officials.182 For example, search filters can prevent analysts from gaining 
access to machine-generated data unless the analysts use pre-approved 
queries. Software can also monitor analyst’s online work to ensure that 
analysts do not try to circumvent such safeguards or otherwise 
overreach.183 
As a descriptive matter, the technological imperative also unduly 
discounts the force of law. In an unprecedented summary of norms 
governing intelligence collection, NSA officials implementing President 
Obama’s PPD-28 guidance to respect privacy worldwide declared that 
signals intelligence scanning, collection, processing, and retention should 
be “as tailored as feasible.”184 NSA has also stated that it will prioritize 
reliance on “diplomatic and public sources.”185 Admittedly, these 
guidelines preserve much of the intelligence agencies’ flexibility, since 
the terms “feasible” and “prioritize” do not expressly preclude other 
options. Nevertheless, it would be glib to dismiss the importance of such 
constraints.  
Guidelines such as those implementing PPD-28 start a conversation, 
which in itself is valuable in the often-closed world of intelligence 
collection.186 In the future, if intelligence agencies give in too readily to 
the temptation to “collect it all” that the technological imperative 
describes, privacy advocates can cite the government’s own guidelines in 
seeking positive change. Legislators as well as bodies such as the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) can provide oversight. In 
                                                                                                                     
 182. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 72; cf. John 
DeLong, Aligning the Compasses: A Journey through Compliance and Technology, IEEE 
Security and Privacy, at 85, 86–88 (July–Aug. 2014) (discussing importance of technology that 
promotes compliance with legal rules); Litt, supra note 54, at 18 (same). 
 183. See id. (discussing individual audit records that compile all queries and permit 
comparison between analysts to detect anomalies that might indicate overreaching); Nathan 
Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT Act, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 1795, 1853 (2010) (same); see also In re Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, 
2009 WL 9150913, at *5, *7–8 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009) (discussing technological safeguards); 
Margulies, supra note 54, at 44 (same); Pozen, supra note 24, at 236–38 (same); Gellman et al., 
supra note 155 (including comments by Robert Litt, General Counsel for the Director of National 
Intelligence, on technological safeguards). 
 184. PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, para. 3.5, at 6. 
 185. Id.  
 186. See, e.g., Transcript of President Obama’s Jan 17 Speech on NSA Reforms, supra note 
181. For an argument that intelligence agencies and their lawyers prior to Snowden’s disclosures 
failed to model this kind of proactive conversation, see Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism 
and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112 (2015); cf. 
Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 289, 340–41 (2015) (discussing virtues and risks of establishing units in the U.S. Executive 
Branch to promote internal compliance with civil and human rights).  
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addition, the proposal advanced below187 would empower an independent 
body to decide if the government was adopting the measured outlook 
captured in the guidelines. Officials may still push the envelope, but they 
will get pushback if they do.  
Skeptics about the government’s ability or willingness to live within 
the law on surveillance also too quickly discount the government’s track 
record in the three years prior to Snowden’s revelations. Consider the 
post-2009 record of the government on the pre-USA Freedom Act 
domestic metadata program that limited analysts’ access to call record 
information. In 2009, the FISC took charge of enforcing limits that 
required an intelligence analyst to use only RAS-approved identifiers 
(RAS stands for “reasonable articulable suspicion”) in queries of the 
database.188 Diligent media efforts in the post-Snowden period have 
uncovered only a handful of violations of the RAS standard out of the 
billions of call records the government acquired.189 
As noted above, skeptics about the U.S. government’s focus on 
tailored collection abroad do not fully reckon with the government’s track 
record of retrieving such tailored intelligence. Consider again the report 
by journalists working with Edward Snowden describing surveillance on 
the Australian national who tried to join the Taliban and conversed with 
his girlfriend during his quest.190 Much of the conversation recorded dealt 
with the Taliban aspirant’s motivations for extremism, which would be 
relevant. In addition, as the girlfriend acknowledged to reporters, she was 
troubled about the target’s extremist bent. This attitude would make her 
a possible informant if the target ever decided to resume his quest for a 
more active role with the Taliban. If the technological imperative were 
an adequate description of U.S. practice, surely journalists with access to 
Snowden’s copious files could have come up with a better example.  
In addition, privacy advocates arguing that state capabilities 
necessarily drive intelligence practices do not pay sufficient attention to 
their own efforts, or to other forces countering the state. In the post-
Snowden era, privacy advocates will have a seat at the table on 
                                                                                                                     
 187. See infra Section V.C. 
 188. See In re Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL 9150913 at *2. The 
FISC became involved because intelligence community officials disclosed to the FISC in early 
2009 that the NSA had earlier used non-RAS-approved identifiers. See Margulies, supra note 54, 
at 45–48. 
 189. See Ryan Gallagher, How NSA Spies Abused Their Powers to Snoop on Girlfriends, 
Lovers, and First Dates, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_ 
tense/2013/09/27/loveint_how_nsa_spies_snooped_on_girlfrgirlf_lovers_and_first_dates.html 
(detailing that the NSA, through lie detector tests routinely given to employees, uncovered twelve 
instances since 2003 in which analysts spied on intimate partners or engaged in other collection 
activities barred by agency procedures).  
 190. See Gellman et al., supra note 155.  
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surveillance policy.191 Moreover, U.S. companies eager to dispel the 
impression that they are mere vassals of the U.S. intelligence community 
will also push back. Finally, other countries will make their voices 
heard.192  
The claim that technology determines state surveillance is most 
plausible as a warning of what will happen if adequate safeguards are not 
in place. A more modest version of the technology-determines-practice 
claim might generate less heat in mobilizing privacy advocates, but it 
would also shed more light.  
IV.  EQUIVALENCY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Now comes the third component of the equivalency thesis: the 
proposition that a state must accord equivalent rights to persons within 
its own borders and persons located overseas with no ties to that state.193 
Here, there is also a statist counterpart: the claim that the ICCPR does not 
apply extraterritorially.194 As in the other issues previously discussed, 
both the statist and equivalency claims miss the mark. This Part addresses 
the statists’ claim, which conflicts with the ICCPR’s language, structure, 
and purpose.195  
The statist view finds support in a superficial reading of the ICCPR’s 
language. Article 2(1) of the agreement obligates each state party “to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”196 The 
                                                                                                                     
 191. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT (2012) (analyzing both 
President Bush’s and President Obama’s counterterrorism programs and finding that presidents 
act with greater discretion and secrecy during times of war). 
 192. See Deeks, supra note 8, at 330. 
 193. See Emmerson, supra note 12, para. 43, at 16. 
 194. This is the U.S. position. See STATE DEP’T PERIODIC REPORTS, supra note 8, at Annex 
1; Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 124–26 (2005) (defending the U.S. 
view). The United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal shares this view. See Human Rights 
Watch v. Sec’y of State, paras. 52–63 (Investig. Powers Trib. 2016), http://www.bailii.org/uk/cas 
es/UKIPTrib/2016/15_165-CH.html.  
 195. In this Section, this Article addresses the equivalency theorists’ claim that the U.S. must 
accord identical rights to those within and without its borders. See infra notes 196–213 and 
accompanying text.  
 196. ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). For more detailed explanation of this 
and other textual arguments, see Margulies, supra note 8, at 2143; see also Marko Milanovic, 
Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
81, 85 (2015) [hereinafter Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance] 
(supporting extraterritorial application of the ICCPR); Marko Milanovic, From Compromise to 
Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties, 8 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 411, 429 (2008) (same); Beth Van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now Is the Time for Change, 90 INT’L 
L. STUD. 20, 57–59 (2014) (same). See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires interpreting a treaty 
“in accordance with the ordinary meaning . . . [of its] terms.”197 Under 
the “ordinary” meaning of two conditions linked by the conjunctive 
“and,” a state incurs a duty only when both conditions are met.198 In other 
words, a state incurs obligations under the ICCPR only to individuals who 
are both “within its territory” and “subject to its jurisdiction.” This 
reading of the ICCPR’s language precludes extraterritorial application. 
However, ordinary rules of textual interpretation provide reasons to 
question the statist view.199 First, this reading makes the verb “respect” 
redundant.200 Generally one assumes that the drafters of a treaty, statute, 
or constitution did not intend mere surplusage or superfluity—each of the 
words used should add something to the agreement’s meaning.201 The 
statist position clashes with this interpretive rule. Consider that the term 
“respect” commits a state to refrain from violations. The term “ensure,” 
in contrast, entails both respect in this sense and affirmative duties to 
guarantee rights against incursions by others. Since “ensure” is a far 
broader term that already encompasses the narrower duty to “respect” 
rights, expressly mentioning the duty to “respect” would be unnecessary 
if the statist position is correct that a state is bound to ensure and respect 
rights only for those individuals within its territory.  
In contrast, the position that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially 
dovetails with the rule against superfluity. On the reading supporting 
extraterritorial application, a state must respect individual rights 
regardless of the location of the individuals. However, the state 
undertakes the larger and more complex obligation to ensure rights only 
regarding those individuals who are both within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                     
Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court 
abandoned the formalistic territorial approach). But see J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical 
Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 464–65 (2006) (suggesting caution in 
extraterritorial reading of the U.S. Constitution).  
 197. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
 198. Margulies, supra note 8, at 2143. Satisfaction of either condition would trigger an 
obligation if the treaty drafters had placed the subjunctive term “or” between the two conditions.  
 199. The textual arguments against the current U.S. reading were made most 
comprehensively in a 2010 memorandum by then-U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Harold 
Koh. See Harold Hongju Koh, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 (Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Koh 
Memorandum].  
 200. Id. at 9.  
 201. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 901, 930, 934–35 (2013) (noting the canon’s importance for courts while reporting that 
congressional drafters do not necessarily view the canon as central to their work, since legislators 
prefer surplus language as a way of stressing substantive points).  
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The U.S. position also violates the rules of grammar.202 Under the U.S. 
view, a state party must “respect . . .  to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights” listed in the treaty.203 Consider 
on the phrase, “respect… to all individuals.” That phrase entails an 
ungrammatical mating of verb and preposition. In English and French 
syntax, one does not “respect” rights “to” rights holders. Americans 
might tolerate sloppy drafting in English, but the French would surely 
insist on flawless French. Massaging the sense of the language could ease 
the grammar problem. For example, one could respect rights “with 
regard” to individuals. However, reading the ICCPR in that way adds two 
words to Article 17. This seems incongruous for a textualist approach that 
purports to rely on the literal language of the treaty. Textualist canons 
exclude a reading that depends on adding words, just as they are skeptical 
of treating some words in the text as superfluous.204 In sum, the statist 
position is stuck with a choice of two alternatives that are both flawed 
from a textualist perspective. Either the drafters used bad grammar, which 
seems unthinkable for the French, or they inadvertently omitted two 
words (“with regard”) from the provision’s text. Each assumption clashes 
with a textualist reading.  
A reading that requires a state to respect rights everywhere but ensure 
rights only in a more limited area where it has greater control is also 
consistent with the intent of the ICCPR’s drafters, as revealed in the 
arguments made by U.S. Representative Eleanor Roosevelt. As Roosevelt 
explained, the United States feared that a broad view of the agreement’s 
territorial scope would require it to guarantee rights within each of the 
defeated Axis powers that the United States and its allies occupied after 
World War II.205 The early wording of Article 2 imposed on a signatory 
state the duty to “guarantee to all persons residing on their territory and 
within their jurisdiction the rights defined in the present covenant.”206 
The term “guarantee” could have created a U.S. commitment to ensure 
rights in the former Axis states. This commitment would have been 
burdensome, impracticable, and arguably illegal under U.S. law.207 To 
forestall this daunting prospect, Roosevelt told the drafting group that the 
agreement’s language should clearly disavow any duty by states to 
                                                                                                                     
 202. See Koh Memorandum, supra note 199, at 10. 
 203. Id. (quoting ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1)). 
 204. See Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada, 30 
OTTAWA L. REV. 175, 184 (1998–99) (observing that, “[f]or a true literalist, adding words to a 
clear text is always unacceptable,” since it amounts to an “amendment” of the statute). 
 205. See U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 193d mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.193 (May 15, 
1950).  
 206. See id. (emphasis added). 
 207. Margulies, supra note 8, at 2144–45. 
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“ensure the rights recognized in [the covenant] to the citizens of countries 
under United States occupation.”208 However, Roosevelt agreed that U.S. 
forces, wherever in the world their mission placed them, had a duty to 
respect rights under the ICCPR,209 since imposing a duty on the United 
States to ensure its own troops’ compliance with the treaty was not 
burdensome or unreasonable.  
Finally, the statist view fails to account for the ICCPR’s logic and 
purpose. The ICCPR, drafted by the United States and its World War II 
allies shortly after the end of that decisive conflict, was a response to the 
unspeakable persecution unleashed by Nazi Germany.210 On a statist 
reading, however, the ICCPR would not bar a recurrence of the prime 
symbol of Nazi human rights abuses: Auschwitz and the other 
concentration camps.211 After all, these death camps were all located 
outside German territory.212 A reading of a post-World War II human 
rights treaty that would not prohibit a repeat of the death camps makes a 
travesty of the ICCPR’s structure and purpose. As Chief Justice John 
Roberts recently noted with respect to the Affordable Care Act, a 
plausible interpretation should respect the purpose behind the drafting of 
a text.213 Under that standard, the statist view of the ICCPR falls short. 
V.  A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO AUTOMATED SEARCHES ABROAD 
Now having established the applicability of Article 17 of the ICCPR, 
which bars “arbitrary” intrusions on privacy, this Article can address how 
that standard affects a state’s overseas machine searches. This Part argues 
that the international law concept of complementarity and the human 
rights doctrine that accords states a “margin of appreciation”214 entitle 
states to a measure of deference in the assessment of their overseas 
surveillance policies. This measure of deference counters surveillance 
critics’ third equivalency proposition: the claim that a state must provide 
a person who is overseas and has no ties to that state precisely the same 
                                                                                                                     
 208. U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 194th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.194 (May 16, 1950) 
(summarizing statements made by Eleanor Roosevelt regarding the adoption of an amendment to 
the agreement). 
 209. Id. at 9. 
 210. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing 
World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 A.J.S. 1373, 1373–74 (2005).  
 211. See Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance, supra note 196, at 
108–11. 
 212. See Nazi Camps, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/e 
n/article.php?ModuleId=10005144 (last updated Jan. 29, 2016). 
 213. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495–96 (2015) (underlining the need to appraise 
the context and structure of statutes, while conceding, citing Justice Felix Frankfurter, that such 
assessments are a “subtle business” (quoting Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939))).  
 214. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 47 (1976). 
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privacy rights that the state provides to its citizens or other individuals 
within its borders.215  
Three crucial considerations buttress the case for deference. First, 
overseas surveillance serves substantial international law interests, 
permitting states to further the intent of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, such as Resolution 2178, which the Security Council recently 
adopted to promote international cooperation against the threat posed by 
foreign and returning fighters associated with ISIS and other terrorist 
groups.216 Second, when used to identify, locate, and deter members of 
groups such as ISIS engaged in an armed conflict with a state, overseas 
surveillance is also consistent with the LOAC.217 Third, surveillance can 
help states ease privacy threats from cyber criminals and foreign 
nations.218  
A.  Deference, Human Rights, and Machine Access  
The first touchstone of any review of state surveillance policies is the 
measure of deference that states have received from transnational human 
rights bodies such as the ECHR. This deference is sometimes couched in 
terms of the complementarity that international tribunals allow to 
individual state determinations219 or the “margin of appreciation” that 
transnational human rights tribunals such as the ECHR show to individual 
states on matters of security and public safety.220 Deference is rooted in 
the structure and logic of international norms.  
All international law depends on the cooperation of states.221 State 
practice shapes customary international law. In addition, state consent is 
required for the promulgation of treaties.222 Failing to allow a measure of 
deference for state interpretation of treaty terms would discourage future 
                                                                                                                     
 215. See, e.g., Emmerson, supra note 12, para. 43, at 16. 
 216. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 22, at 1–2. 
 217. Cf. Schmitt, supra note 25, at 596–97 (noting the importance of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance in war-fighting). 
 218. See generally Pozen, supra note 24, at 229 (noting that with a reduction in surveillance, 
“risk may be shifted not only among groups that suffer privacy harms but also among groups that 
cause harm to a certain privacy interest—among privacy violators as well as victims”). 
 219. Samuel C. Birnbaum, Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal Court, 48 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 307, 337–39 (2015). 
 220. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 47 (1976); see also 
Robert D. Sloane, Human Rights for Hedgehogs?: Global Value Pluralism, International Law, 
and Some Reservations of the Fox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 975, 983 (2010) (noting that the ECHR allows 
states “a ‘margin of appreciation’ within which to implement or interpret human rights in ways 
that may be sensitive or responsive to prevailing social, cultural, and other norms within their 
polities”). 
 221. See William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structural 
Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 38 (2015). 
 222. See Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters––Non-State Actors, Treaties, 
and the Changing Sources of International Law, BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 137, 144 (2005).  
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treaties and encourage defection from treaty regimes.223 Moreover, 
international law bodies have a competence deficit in dealing with the 
special problems faced by individual states. Navigating the currents of 
local custom and culture can be perilous. Lending a measure of deference 
to state officials’ efforts ensures that officials with greater knowledge of 
those institutional and cultural factors can take a first crack at the issue, 
thereby reducing the mistakes made by transnational bodies lacking such 
local knowledge.224  
1.  Deference and Harmonizing International Norms 
One vital function of deference is giving states the space they need to 
sort out tensions between disparate international law norms. A rigid 
approach cannot reckon with the exigencies that shape the 
implementation of norms. In contrast, granting states a measure of 
deference can minimize norm conflicts.  
Consider U.N. Security Council resolutions enacted after September 
11 to address the threat of terrorism. For example, Security Council 
Resolution 2178 addresses the burgeoning threat of ISIS.225 Resolution 
2178 focuses on the threat of foreign fighters joining ISIS, acquiring safe 
harbors in states that are unwilling or unable to combat the terrorist 
group226 and then returning to their native countries in the West to engage 
in violence. The Security Council warned specifically about the “increased 
use by terrorists . . . of communications technology . . . including . . . the 
internet” as a means of recruitment.227 To address this concern, the Security 
Council highlighted the need for member states to cooperate in preventing 
terrorists from “exploiting technology . . . [and] communications.”228  
Carefully tailored overseas surveillance makes the Security Council’s 
wishes an achievable blueprint, instead of an exercise in airy aspiration. 
If machine learning can enhance the effectiveness of overseas 
surveillance, it should be part of the equation. After all, terrorists readily 
                                                                                                                     
 223. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International 
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1834 (2002) (raising the question of the point at which the “substantive 
rules or review mechanism” become “too constraining” on states). 
 224. See Sloane, supra note 220, at 982–83; cf. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact 
Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1364–66 (2009) (analyzing factors influencing U.S. judicial 
deference to executive decisions). 
 225. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 22, at 2; see also S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 23, at para. 
3 (urging, in a resolution passed shortly after the September 11 attacks, that states share 
“operational information . . . regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks” 
and “use of communications technologies by terrorist groups”). 
 226. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 22, at 1. 
 227. Id. at 2. 
 228. Id. at 3, 7. 
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cross borders, in both physical and virtual domains.229 Such groups are 
not known for their acquiescence to Security Council resolutions.230 Nor 
do they advertise their specific plans for violence. Indeed, a crucial aspect 
of ISIS’s tactical advantage is the power of surprise it has gained through 
its diffuse, decentralized operation.231  
ISIS has also taken advantage of the weakness and chaos that has 
afflicted states in the Middle East. A terrorist group that establishes a safe 
haven in a state that is riven by armed conflict, such as Syria, Iraq, or 
Yemen, can then mount or inspire operations in other states.232 Even 
when those state targets of terror have functioning legal systems and 
control over their own territory, they are unable to directly regulate 
terrorist groups that have found safe havens in other countries.233 
Cultivating informants and other sources of human intelligence is 
difficult when a safe harbor state is unwilling or unable to cooperate with 
the international community.234 
Because an international framework is only as strong as its weakest 
link, safe haven states can undermine global counterterrorism efforts. In 
the face of terrorists’ opportunism in finding safe havens, a target state’s 
ability to conduct surveillance abroad can help bridge the gap in 
knowledge of terrorists groups’ structure, operations, and plans for future 
violence.235 Surveillance that harnesses today’s technology, but does so 
with appropriate constraints, can be an equalizer in the battle against ISIS 
and other groups that practice violent extremism. A rigid definition of 
international privacy norms that short-circuits this counterterrorism effort 
would ultimately be self-defeating, leaving the initiative with forces like 
                                                                                                                     
 229. See id. at 2.  
 230. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30–31 (2010) (detailing terrorist 
groups’ disregard for legal requirements).  
 231. See David Ignatius, How ISIS Spread in the Middle East and How to Stop It, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-
syria-iraq/412042/.  
 232. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 22, at 2. 
 233. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 34 (upholding a material support statute 
against First Amendment and vagueness challenges, and observing that deference was important 
in national security and foreign relations cases because in those areas “information can be difficult 
to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess”). 
 234. See generally Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative 
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012) (describing the 
elaborate test a victim state must evaluate before attacking a safe harbor state unable or unwilling 
to take action against residing terrorists); cf. Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State 
Actors: The State of Play, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 12–13 (2015) (explaining that the unable and 
unwilling standard today applies broadly to non-state actors harbored in unwilling or unable 
states).  
 235. Peter Margulies, Rage Against the Machine?: Automated Surveillance and Human 
Rights 4 (Roger Williams U. L. Stud. Paper No. 164, 2015). 
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ISIS that emphatically reject liberal norms such as privacy. In contrast, a 
deferential approach would give states the flexibility they need to combat 
violent extremism, while still demanding constraints that preserve 
fundamental rights. 
2.  Surveillance and Armed Conflict  
LOAC236 also counsels for a measure of deference to states on 
surveillance. Courts need to reconcile the foundational norms of human 
rights law, including the bar on arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, 
with the distinctive challenges posed by the existence of armed conflict, 
including the privilege to use lethal force against other participants in the 
conflict.237 LOAC provides more concrete guidance on these issues. 
Consequently, LOAC’s provisions should inform but not displace human 
rights law,238 including ICCPR Article 17’s prohibition on arbitrary 
intrusions on privacy. While LOAC does not provide a blanket 
justification for surveillance, overseas surveillance in the course of an 
armed conflict has clear implications for LOAC that human rights law 
should acknowledge.  
In Hassan v. United Kingdom, the ECHR, addressing international 
armed conflicts between states, strove to integrate LOAC and human 
rights norms.239 Hassan addressed the issue of detention in Iraq.240 The 
ECHR recognized that under human rights law, an individual has the right 
to freedom from arbitrary deprivations of liberty.241 At the same time, the 
                                                                                                                     
 236. For leading literature on international armed conflict law, see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed. 2010); 
Michael N. Schmitt et al., The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, INT’L 
INST. HUMANITARIAN L. 1, 2, 8 (2006). 
 237. See Legality of the Threat Or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶¶ 95–96 (July 8); Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 387 (2009) (endorsing “modifying the content of . . . treaty norms . . . by 
importing relevant rules (if any exist) from the law of armed conflict”).  
 238. See Hassan v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 36 (2014). Historically, LOAC has 
been viewed as lex specialis—as law that preempts other otherwise operative provisions of 
international law. See Neuman, supra note 237, at 387. However, courts, including the ECHR in 
Hassan, have aimed for a more tempered approach that reconciles LOAC and human rights norms 
without the wholesale displacement of either corpus of law.  
 239. Hassan, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 104 (ruling that in an international armed conflict, human 
rights norms “continue to apply, albeit interpreted against the background” of LOAC’s 
provisions). 
 240. Id. at para. 3. 
 241. Id. at para. 7. The Hassan court interpreted the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which in Article 5, Section 1 secures the right to “liberty and security of the person” and 
enumerates specific exceptions, such as detention pending criminal trial or deportation. Id. at para. 
96. These exceptions do not include detention during an armed conflict. Id. at paras. 96–97. The 
Hassan court asserted that the “fundamental purpose of Article 5 § 1” of the European Convention 
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court recognized that in armed conflict, a state had the legal right to detain 
combatants whom it had captured to prevent them from reentering the 
fray.242 Although detention under LOAC was not expressly enumerated 
in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Hassan court 
interpreted the Convention to accommodate this venerable aspect of 
armed conflict.243  
A similar analysis might govern surveillance. On the one hand, 
reconnaissance and surveillance of another party to an armed conflict are 
accepted incidents of war.244 The law of war does not preclude 
espionage245 and permits a wide range of observation of enemy forces. 
This observation can be clandestine or open. A non-international armed 
conflict, such as the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda and 
associated forces, does not diminish a state’s prerogatives to engage in 
such observation of its adversaries.246 A rigid application of the ICCPR 
                                                                                                                     
was “to protect the individual from arbitrariness.” Id. at para. 105.  
 242. Id. at para. 104.  
 243. Id.   
 244. See Schmitt, supra note 25, at 597. Even absent an armed conflict, surveillance of cyber 
threats might be an appropriate countermeasure for a state injured by another state’s failure to 
control cyber intrusions emanating from the second state’s territory. See Michael N. Schmitt, 
“Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and 
International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 705–07 (2014). 
 245. Jordan J. Paust, Can You Hear Me Now?: Private Communication, National Security, 
and the Human Rights Disconnect, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 612, 647 (2015) (noting that “widely 
practiced espionage regarding foreign state secrets is not a violation of international law”). The 
International Court of Justice has issued preliminary relief barring one state from conducting 
surveillance on officials of another state in peacetime. See Questions Relating to the Seizure and 
Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measure, 2014 
I.C.J. Rep. 147, ¶ 27 (Mar. 3). That decision turned on the integrity of arbitral proceedings 
involving the two countries. See id. ¶ 42 (asserting that the right of a state to engage in arbitration 
could “suffer irreparable harm” if the state conducting such surveillance used the information 
acquired to gain an advantage). 
 246. Schmitt, supra note 25, at 597–98. One question remaining after the ECHR’s decision 
in Hassan is the applicability of its holding to non-international armed conflicts between a state 
and a non-state actor, such as Al Qaeda or ISIS. See generally Hakimi, supra note 234 (discussing 
the state of the law on armed conflicts against non-state actors). Some language in Hassan 
supports a narrow reading, which would limit authority to detain to traditional international armed 
conflicts between states. See Hassan, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 104 (noting that “[i]t can only be in 
cases of international armed conflict, where the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of 
civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted features . . . that Article 5 could be interpreted 
as permitting the exercise of such broad powers”). If this narrow view is correct, in a non-
international armed conflict, a state would have to formally derogate from its duties under the 
governing human rights treaty. This derogation would then be subject to proportionality review. 
See A. and Others v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 14–17 (2009). This is the view taken 
by an intermediate-level British court. See Mohammed v. Sec’y of State for Defence [2015] 
EWCA Civ. 843 [¶¶ 242, 246] (Eng.), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/serdar-mohammed-v-ssd-yunus-rahmatullah-v-mod-and-fco.pdf. 
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that precluded such observation would disrupt LOAC. On the other hand, 
unchecked overseas surveillance in an armed conflict could lead to the 
arbitrary intrusions on privacy that the ICCPR prohibits. Given this 
tension, compliance with safeguards would permit tailored 
reconnaissance and surveillance, while protecting rights.247 
3.  Overseas Machine Surveillance and Privacy Trade-Offs 
Another reason to extend a measure of deference to states is the 
presence of what Professor David Pozen has called privacy–privacy 
trade-offs.248 Nationals of all states face privacy threats not only from 
their own government, but also from other states and non-state actors. 
While states wishing to conduct surveillance overseas cannot use this risk 
as a blanket justification for any surveillance scheme, the need to conduct 
surveillance to detect and monitor such privacy threats is an added 
justification for granting states a quantum of discretion. 
As an example, consider the view expressly held by the U.S. 
government that China has been responsible for a wide range of cyber 
intrusions in the United States.249 To facilitate these intrusions, Chinese 
operatives may have sought to “spoof” other Internet Protocol addresses 
based in other states or take over networks of computers in other 
jurisdictions.250 While tradecraft of this kind can make it difficult to 
                                                                                                                     
A broader reading of Hassan would argue that the Court’s language was dicta because the 
case concerned an international armed conflict. This view would stress the convergence of the 
law regarding international and non-international armed conflicts and the functional case for 
detaining participants in the latter situation to prevent them from engaging in further violence 
during the pendency of the conflict. See id. ¶¶ 205–09, 235–40 (discussing commentary by 
academics and legal advisers for the International Committee of the Red Cross). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that the conflict with Al Qaeda is a non-international armed conflict, in 
which both the power of states to detain and the safeguards accorded captives under Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions presumptively apply. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 630 (2006) (holding that conflict with Al Qaeda is “not of an international character” and is 
therefore subject to the Geneva Conventions’ Common Article 3); cf. Geoffrey Corn & Eric 
Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A “Principled” Approach to the Regulation of 
Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 46, 66 (2009) (contending that the non-
international armed conflict designation model is most appropriate for purely internal rebellions 
or civil wars and that conflict with transnational terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda or ISIS 
requires a different model). 
 247. Cf. WITTES & BLUM, supra note 42, at 200–01 (conceding the risk that U.S. surveillance 
could target disfavored groups but arguing that safeguards have vastly reduced this risk). 
 248. See Pozen, supra note 24, at 222. 
 249. Randal L. Gainer, DOD Adopts Interim Cyber Rules as Claims of Chinese Cyber Attacks 
Continue, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/internati 
onal-privacy-law/dod-adopts-interim-cyber-rules-as-claims-of-chinese-cyber-attacks-continue/.  
 250. See David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY 
J. 531, 535 & n.5 (2011); Peter Margulies, Sovereignty and Cyber Attacks: Technology’s 
Challenge to the Law of State Responsibility, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 496, 503 (2013). 
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attribute responsibility for cyber intrusions, repeat players at such tasks 
often use similar tactics over time. These techniques can reveal a 
signature for the hackers, just as criminals in the analog world acquire a 
modus operandi that brands their work.251 However, detecting such 
tradecraft requires a certain level of surveillance. Machine surveillance 
that looks for cyber signatures linked to past attacks can deter hackers 
and provide useful information about cyber-criminals’ future plans. Even 
when such intrusions cannot be stopped, the information acquired can 
allow the government and prospective private victims of intrusions to 
improve their resilience and minimize each intrusion’s impact. Individual 
states can judge the need for surveillance to protect against cyber attacks 
far more accurately than an international body handing down rigid rules.  
4.  Deference and Post-Snowden Privacy Decisions from European 
Courts 
Recent decisions by the CJEU and the ECHR may at first blush appear 
to challenge the deferential approach. Both the CJEU’s decision in 
Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner252 and the ECHR’s decision 
in Zakharov v. Russia253 resulted in the invalidation of regimes that, 
according to each court, failed to provide adequate safeguards for 
privacy. Each decision is notable in its insistence that deference cannot 
be absolute and that any program that authorizes or permits access to 
personal information by intelligence agencies must have safeguards. 
However, as this Article points out, Schrems dealt only with an important 
but limited EU agreement on commercial data sharing, not with 
individual EU states’ surveillance programs, which lie beyond the 
CJEU’s jurisdiction. Zakharov struck down a surveillance program in 
Vladimir Putin’s Russia that was so fundamentally out of step with the 
rule of law that the case’s relevance is questionable for other states, such 
as France and the United Kingdom, with more robust democratic 
traditions and current systems of accountability.  
a.  Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner and the Need for a More 
Privacy-Friendly Transatlantic Data-Sharing Agreement  
In Schrems, the CJEU found that an agreement allowing EU firms to 
share EU residents’ private data with U.S. firms lacked adequate privacy 
protections.254 The Schrems decision invalidated the so-called “Safe 
                                                                                                                     
 251. See SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 132 (discussing the attribution of responsibility for cyber 
intrusions based on forensic analysis). 
 252. Case C-362/14, 2015 E.C.R. 
 253. Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 147, 300–04 (2015).  
 254. Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-4. For commentary on Schrems, see Francesca Bignami 
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Harbor” agreement, under which private firms in Europe could share 
customer information with U.S. firms to facilitate transnational business 
transactions.255 Under the Safe Harbor agreement, U.S. firms self-
certified that they had implemented privacy principles, and the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission’s Consumer Protection Bureau policed firms’ 
privacy practices.256 The Safe Harbor agreement also included a 
conclusive presumption that data sharing pursuant to the agreement 
complied with the privacy protections in Article 25 of the European 
Charter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.257 This conclusive 
presumption insulated Safe Harbor from privacy challenges mounted by 
individual state data-protection authorities. 
The Schrems case arose after Snowden’s revelations when 
Maximilian Schrems, a law student and Austrian national who 
maintained a Facebook account governed by a contract with Facebook 
Ireland, took steps to prevent the transfer of his personal information to 
the United States.258 Schrems asked Irish data-protection authorities to 
stop the transfer of his data. Irish authorities refused, citing the Safe 
Harbor’s presumption of compliance with EU law.259 The High Court of 
Ireland affirmed the data commissioner’s decision.260 However, the High 
Court was concerned that Safe Harbor might violate the European 
Charter. Accordingly, the High Court referred the case to the CJEU.261 
The CJEU struck down the conclusive presumption that data shared 
under Safe Harbor received all of the protections required under EU law, 
                                                                                                                     
& Giorgio Resta, Transatlantic Privacy Regulation: Conflict and Cooperation 131–32 (George 
Washington Univ. Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2015-52, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705 
601 (praising CJEU’s upholding of privacy principles); Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe 
Harbor in a Widening Sea: Unpacking the EJC’s Schrems Decision and What It Means for 
Transatlantic Relations, SETON HALL J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2680263 (critiquing the decision as failing to offer an accurate account 
of U.S. intelligence collection); Peter Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms 
Since 2013, at 10–18 (Ga. Tech. Scheller Coll. of Bus., Research Paper No. 36), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2709619 (pointing out mischaracterizations of U.S. programs such as 
Section 702 in an opinion on Safe Harbor by EU Advocate General Bot, which CJEU relied on in 
its opinion). 
 255. Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-3, I-31. 
 256. Id. at I-9. 
 257. Id. at I-9 to -10.  
 258. Id. at I-19; Juliet Fioretti & Georgina Prodhan, Schrems: The Law Student Who Brought 
down a Transatlantic Data Pact, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2015, 4:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/arti 
cle/us-eu-ireland-privacy-schrems-idUSKCN0S02NY20151006; cf. Mieke Eoyang, Beyond 
Privacy and Security: The Role of the Telecommunications Industry in Electronic Surveillance 
11–12 (Hoover Inst. Essay Series Paper No. 1603, 2016) (Apr. 2016) (discussing EU indignation 
about U.S. surveillance post-Snowden that led up to Schrems decision).  
 259. Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-19. 
 260. Id. at I-19 to -20. 
 261. Id. at I-21. 
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holding that state data-protection authorities could challenge Safe Harbor 
as not offering an “adequate level of protection” to individuals’ private 
personal information under Article 25 of the European Charter.262 To 
support its holding, the CJEU cited Snowden’s revelations, asserting that 
Safe Harbor did not adequately protect individuals’ data from the full 
extent of collection and surveillance by U.S. intelligence agencies.263 In 
particular, the CJEU noted that the Safe Harbor agreement did not include 
a finding that U.S. intelligence agencies, in the course of pursuing 
concededly “legitimate” objectives, such as national security, had 
adopted rules to curb “interference” with the privacy rights of EU 
citizens.264 The CJEU also cited concerns expressed by the European 
Commission after the Snowden disclosures that U.S. access to “personal 
data” exceeded what was “strictly necessary and proportionate” to fulfill 
those legitimate national security objectives.265 Schrems has structural, 
substantive, and procedural ramifications for any future EU–U.S. data-
sharing agreement.  
i.  Structure in Schrems 
The CJEU’s decision creates significant collective action problems in 
the EU by weakening the ability of the EU to agree to terms with the 
United States on data sharing. Any agreement would have to contain 
express acknowledgment that the U.S. government, including its security 
agencies, had enacted safeguards on the use of EU subjects’ personal 
data.266 Moreover, even if the agreement included a specific description 
of U.S. government safeguards, Schrems seems to leave open the 
possibility that EU member state data commissioners could challenge the 
agreement as not providing protections that are “equivalent” to those that 
the EU provides.267 Any U.S.–EU agreement would then be subject to a 
holdout problem, since any single EU member state’s data privacy 
authority could delay the agreement and ask that the CJEU invalidate it. 
                                                                                                                     
 262. Id. at I-25. 
 263. Id. at I-31. 
 264. Id. at I-30. 
 265. Id. at I-31 to -32. 
 266. See infra notes 371–78 and accompanying text (discussing prospects for the U.S. 
enactment of the Judicial Redress Act, which would provide EU residents with protections 
extended to U.S. persons in the Privacy Act, such as recourse, with exceptions for national security 
and law enforcement needs, against agencies that improperly collected, retained, or disseminated 
personal information). 
 267. See Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-33. Ironically, because Safe Harbor provided for 
review of U.S. participating firms’ privacy policies by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 
difficulties in implementing a replacement for Safe Harbor may leave EU residents with fewer 
privacy protections. See Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation 
Post Schrems 11, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2732346.  
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Imagine if the Framers of the U.S. Constitution had required a unanimous 
vote from Congress to enact legislation. That chaotic situation was 
exactly what the Framers wished to overcome when they drafted a 
Constitution with a strong federal government and robust limits on 
individual states’ power to engage in foreign affairs.268 Schrems appears 
to invite comparable chaos. 
On the structural front, bilateral agreements between states could 
furnish a “fix” for Schrems. The CJEU interprets EU law, which 
expressly disclaims authority over member states’ national security and 
law enforcement legislation.269 This carve-out for individual states is part 
of the bargain that created the European Union. As a consequence, the 
United States or U.S. firms could reach bilateral agreements or conclude 
contracts with each member state.270 The United States has engaged in a 
similar bilateral strategy in dealing with the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), concluding agreements with almost one hundred states that they 
will not refer cases to the ICC involving U.S. personnel conducting 
activities within those states’ borders.271 However, such agreements are 
problematic in a number of respects.  
First, bilateral agreements can be cumbersome to negotiate272 and may 
not be fully binding,273 particularly if new revelations about U.S. 
collection practices fuel claims that circumstances have arisen that were 
not contemplated by the agreements’ drafters or included in the 
agreements’ text. Second, even if the CJEU would not have jurisdiction 
over any such agreements, the ECHR would have jurisdiction over claims 
that the agreements violated the privacy protections in the European 
                                                                                                                     
 268. James Madison had warned that the weak federal government of the Articles of 
Confederation period allowed “any indiscreet member [state] to embroil the confederacy with 
foreign nations”). See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 281 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 269. See Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-10 to -12 (citing EU Data Protection Directive, 
Preamble, 13th recital). “[A]ctivities [such as]… public safety, defence, State security 
or . . . criminal laws fall outside the scope of [European] Community law . . . .” EU Data 
Protection Directive, Preamble, 13th recital. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, O.J. (L 281) 2.  
 270. See Shackelford, supra note 254, at 4 (warning that absent reaching an agreement that 
will satisfy all EU members and the CJEU, companies will have to resort to “expensive and time-
consuming model contracts or other agreements to continue transatlantic data transfers”).  
 271. Stuart W. Risch, Hostile Outsider or Influential Insider? The United States and the 
International Criminal Court, 2009 ARMY LAWYER 61, 80–81 (2009) (noticing that “[t]hese 
bilateral accords certify that neither signing state will arrest, extradite, or otherwise surrender the 
other’s personnel to the Court”).  
 272. See Shackelford, supra note 254, at 4. 
 273. See Risch, supra note 271, at 82 (stating that “the Bilateral Immunity Agreements 
(BIAs) do not bind the ICC in any way”).  
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Convention on Human Rights.274 The ECHR might be skeptical of such 
agreements, viewing them as an expedient rather than a principled 
approach worthy of deference. Third, and relatedly, U.S. circumvention 
of Schrems might ultimately lead to a diminution in America’s “soft 
power”: its ability to persuade other nations of the rightness of its 
positions through its leadership role.275 Fourth, political and legal 
crosscurrents in various EU member states might make the conclusion of 
such agreements difficult, recreating the holdout problem mentioned 
above. For example, suppose all states agreed except for Germany. Given 
Germany’s dominant position in Europe’s economy, a regime of bilateral 
agreements that did not include Germany would hardly be worth the cost. 
ii.  Schrems and the Interplay of Substance and Procedure 
Because the individual and bilateral fixes for Schrems involve 
significant uncertainty, it is worthwhile to ponder Schrems’s substantive 
and procedural lessons. The CJEU does not clearly separate its 
substantive and procedural concerns. This Article does so here, with the 
proviso that both Schrems’s posture and the decision’s lack of clear 
separation between substantive and procedural aspects suggest flexibility 
on the part of the Court that belies the strict privacy-protective rhetoric 
of the decision.276 
The posture of the Schrems decision leaves the door open to a more 
flexible approach, since the decision addresses only the threshold 
                                                                                                                     
 274. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8(1), 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Human Rights] 
(“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”); id. art. 8(2) (“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
 275. See Risch, supra note 271, at 66 (discussing how the United States’ bilateralist approach 
to avoiding jurisdiction of ICC has been costly to America’s global reputation and to necessary 
collaboration with other states); see also JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER 
35 (2002) (arguing that a failure by the United States to build global consensus will result in the 
loss of “important opportunities for cooperation in the solution of global problems such as 
terrorism”); cf. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480 
(2003) (highlighting international perception that the United States believes that its global role 
creates entitlement to exceptions from human rights and other norms). 
 276. See Bignami & Resta, supra note 254, at 129 (noting the Schrem court’s “hardening 
stance on the right to personal data protection”); cf. Google Spain v. Spanish Data Prot. Agency 
& Costeja, 2014 I.C.J. paras. 20, 99 (May 13) (finding a “right to be forgotten” based on EU 
privacy guarantees that require internet search firms such as Google to heed requests to delete 
irrelevant, outdated, and prejudicial material from searchable online data upon an application by 
an aggrieved party). 
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question of whether Safe Harbor could bar challenges by individual state 
data-protection authorities. The CJEU held only that the Safe Harbor 
agreement was invalid because it wrongly presumed U.S. compliance 
with the European Charter and thus unlawfully precluded challenges by 
individual EU state data-protection authorities. In the course of 
supporting that holding, the CJEU engaged in a preliminary and 
somewhat imprecise discussion of U.S. surveillance in the wake of 
Snowden’s disclosures. However, the CJEU did not rule on any 
substantive challenge brought by state data-protection authorities. No 
such challenge was before the court. Instead, the CJEU merely indicated 
that the Safe Harbor agreement did not provide sufficient safeguards to 
preclude such a challenge. Viewed in this context, the CJEU’s substantive 
discussion was at best support for a threshold finding that the agreement 
lacked adequate assurances. A more comprehensive analysis by the court 
of how U.S. intelligence collection—including post-Snowden 
reforms277—meshed with EU law would have to await adjudication of a 
challenge brought by state data-protection commissioners.278 
Turning to the substance of EU privacy protections, the CJEU 
suggested that U.S. government access to EU residents’ data had to be 
“strictly necessary and proportionate” to the U.S. interest in national 
security and law enforcement.279 Yet what this standard might mean in a 
particular case, including Schrems itself, is not exactly clear from the 
CJEU opinion. The court does not undertake a concrete analysis of major 
U.S. collection and surveillance programs, including Section 702, EO 
12,333, or the domestic collection of metadata. Indeed, the CJEU does 
not even mention that Congress, in the USA Freedom Act, had enacted a 
fundamental change in the metadata program as it was authorized prior 
to Snowden’s disclosures, leaving data in private firms’ hands subject to 
specific government requests that the FISC had to approve in advance.280 
The CJEU also did not address the limits in Section 702 or those imposed 
as part of the United States’ PPD-28 process. 
Instead of engaging in a specific analysis of U.S. collection and 
surveillance law, the court appeared to rely on concerns expressed by the 
European Commission and a Working Group established by the 
                                                                                                                     
 277. See Swire, supra note 254, at 10–21 (discussing how the media has misclassified U.S. 
intelligence collection reforms under Section 702 and how they provide much more protection 
and oversight than widely believed).  
 278. The CJEU could also consider an appeal by an individual from a decision by state 
authorities finding as a substantive matter that the U.S. provided protections equivalent to those 
in the EU. 
 279. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-31 to -32. 
 280. See Swire, supra note 254, at 26 (“This approach was codified in the USA Act, passed 
in 2015, which also prohibited the bulk collection of telephone metadata and required the queries 
to be submitted with court approval to the providers.”).  
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Commission.281 However, the Commission documents predate passage 
of the USA Freedom Act and the PPD-28 process.282 This makes for an 
unfortunate gap in the court’s analysis. 
Moreover, even insofar as the EU Commission documents referred to 
in Schrems deal with pre-Snowden collection and surveillance, those 
documents do not comprehensively address substantive limits that were 
already in place. For example, the Commission documents cross-
referenced in the Schrems decision highlight one issue under Section 702: 
the statutory allowance for collection of information relating to the 
“foreign affairs” of the United States.283 The Commission Working 
Group, as well as privacy advocates on both sides of the Atlantic, viewed 
this provision as permitting the broad-based collection of information on 
any individual or entity, private or public, that in some attenuated way 
affects U.S. foreign relations. Viewed in that light, of course, the “foreign 
affairs” prong of Section 702 would render the other, more specific 
provisions of the statute meaningless. However, both the provision’s text 
and its apparent application suggest a far narrower meaning. 
Section 702 allows collection of intelligence “with respect to a foreign 
power or foreign territory” relating to the “the conduct of the foreign 
affairs of the United States.”284 In U.S. intelligence law, the term “foreign 
power” refers to a foreign government or a non-state entity such as Al 
Qaeda or ISIS that holds itself out as fulfilling the functions of a state, 
                                                                                                                     
 281. See Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-16 to -18. 
 282. Id. at I-17 (noting that EU Commission documents were issued on November 27, 2013, 
before the announcement or implementation of U.S. reforms).  
 283. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B) (2012); see also Peter Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs” 
in Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act: The Virtues and Deficits of Post-Snowden Dialogue 
on U.S. Surveillance Policy, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2015) (“The ‘foreign affairs’ 
language . . . is not a residual clause authorizing all the collection and surveillance precluded by 
other definitions in the statute. It simply allows the United States to gather information relating to 
other states’ compliance with norms and the prospects for international cooperation on 
enforcement.”). But see Claude Moraes (Rapporteur), Draft Report on the US NSA Surveillance 
Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ 
Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, 7–8, 11, E.N. 
Doc. 2013/2188(INI) (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jan/-draft-nsa-
surveillance-report.pdf (acknowledging analogous exceptions in a report issued before President 
Obama’s speech in January 2014, but arguing that NSA surveillance could be “used for reasons 
other than national security and the… fight against terrorism, for example economic and industrial 
espionage or profiling on political grounds” and was not “necessary and proportionate” vis à vis 
exceptions); Timothy Edgar, Focusing PRISM: An Answer to European Privacy Concerns?, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2015), https://lawfareblog.com/focusing-prism-answer-european-privacy-
concerns (arguing for narrowing Section 702); Elizabeth Goitein & Faiza Patel, What Went 
Wrong with the FISA Court, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 27 (Mar. 18, 2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-went-wrong-fisa-court (critiquing Section 702 
“foreign affairs” provision). 
 284. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B). 
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including defense.285 Under established principles of construction, the 
indefinite article “a” preceding “foreign power” also modifies “foreign 
territory.” Bear in mind that courts generally disfavor superfluity in 
statutory interpretation.286 If “foreign territory” had the capacious 
meaning contemplated by privacy advocates, that broader definition 
would render the preceding statutory term “foreign power” superfluous. 
There would be no point in expressly authorizing collection “with respect 
to a foreign power” if Congress had already authorized any collection that 
happened to entail a person or entity located outside the United States. To 
give the term “foreign power” any meaning under the statute, one must 
also give the term “foreign territory” a more circumscribed meaning than 
the catch-all connotation that privacy advocates fear. 
Viewed in this light, Section 702’s authorization of collection 
regarding a “foreign territory” contemplates two narrowly circumscribed 
situations. The first connotes a specific unit of land that a foreign power 
has annexed, as Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States. The second 
use of “territory” entails a specific area that is legally under the sovereign 
jurisdiction of a foreign power, but as a practical matter that power does 
not control it (this might describe certain activities within “failed” or 
“failing” states such as Yemen). Each version or a combination of both 
ensures some independent meaning for both “foreign power” and 
“foreign territory,” and therefore complies with the canon disfavoring 
superfluity. 
In practice, moreover, the U.S. interpretation of “foreign affairs” 
includes a more circumscribed definition focusing on foreign 
governments: activities regarding international agreements, including 
bribery, collusion, and even the formation of negotiating positions on 
matters such as sanctions for state sponsors of terrorism.287 While this 
information is sensitive, its collection is consistent with longtime 
international understandings that espionage is not a violation of 
international law.288 
                                                                                                                     
 285. Id. § 1801(a) (describing “foreign power” as a “foreign government,” a “faction of a 
foreign nation or nations,” an “entity . . . openly acknowledged by a foreign government . . . to be 
directed and controlled by” a foreign government or governments, or a terrorist group, “foreign-
based political organization,” an entity “directed and controlled by a foreign government or 
governments,” or an entity “engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction”).  
 286. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 201, at 934–35 (noting that “the political interests 
of the audience often demand redundancy”); supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text 
(discussing avoiding superfluity in interpreting ICCPR).  
 287. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Book Reveals Wider Net of U.S. Spying on Envoys, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/world/middleeast/book-reveals-
wider-net-of-us-spying-on-envoys.html (discussing the NSA’s role in the diplomatic negotiations 
leading up to Iran sanctions). 
 288. See Paust, supra note 245, at 647 (“Also complicating rational and policy-serving 
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However, to stem the European concern voiced in Schrems, Congress 
and the Executive Branch should consider either amending the “foreign 
affairs” prong to promote greater clarity and specificity or conveying an 
executive branch interpretation in public or private that would vindicate 
these goals. For example, administration officials could assure their EU 
counterparts that Section 702 would not permit spying on individual EU 
residents for purposes that would be barred under EO 12,333, such as 
suppressing speech critical of the United States; discriminating against 
racial, religious, or ethnic groups; or gaining a competitive advantage for 
U.S. companies.289 These assurances might allay the fears expressed in 
Schrems. Such an effort would be worthwhile as part of the overall 
process of enhancing transparency that is key to PPD-28.  
On the question addressed in this Article—the legality of machine (as 
opposed to human) access to data—Schrems is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the court seemed most concerned with the “storage” of data, not 
with a computer’s scanning of such information.290 Ironically, however, 
given the court’s taking the United States to task for its purported failure 
to limit surveillance, the court’s own description of U.S. programs takes 
a shotgun approach. That approach breeds uncertainty about the true 
scope of the CJEU’s critique. The CJEU’s broad characterization of U.S. 
intelligence efforts does not fit U.S. intelligence agencies’ relatively 
limited storage of transnational communications under Section 702 but 
may be more accurate as a description of U.S. machine scanning. 
For example, the Schrems court asserted that U.S. intelligence 
collection entailed 
storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose data 
has been transferred from the European Union to the United 
States without any differentiation, limitation or exception 
being made in the light of the objective pursued and without 
an objective criterion being laid down by which to determine 
the limits of the access of the public authorities.291 
This harsh indictment does not resemble the Section 702 Upstream 
program. Upstream scans a wide range of transatlantic communications 
as they pass through buffers or caches in communications hubs.292 
Nevertheless, Upstream entails storage of only a limited number of 
                                                                                                                     
choice is the widespread recognition that espionage engaged in by a state within a foreign state 
can violate the latter’s domestic law, but widely practiced espionage regarding foreign state 
secrets is not a violation of international law.”).  
 289. See PPD-28, supra note 27, at 3–6. 
 290. See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-32. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See Swire, supra note 254, at 18.  
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communications that are to, from, or about particular selectors linked to 
Section 702 categories, such as terrorism, espionage, and the limited 
“foreign affairs” prong discussed above.293 Perhaps the CJEU viewed 
scanning and storage as identical intrusions on privacy. However, a court 
drawing that conclusion should have justified its equation of scanning 
and storage, which engender disparate risks of human overreaching.  
Finally, Schrems has a procedural component that builds on the 
CJEU’s prior decision in Digital Rights Ireland.294 Procedurally, Schrems 
calls for two attributes discussed in the normative section of this piece: 
independent review of surveillance policies and recourse for those 
victimized by such policies. As the CJEU noted, “The very existence of 
effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with provisions 
of EU law is inherent in the existence of the rule of law.”295 To be 
effective, the reviewing body must be independent of the agencies whose 
policies it purports to review. Moreover, each individual should have the 
right of “access to personal data relating to him” and the right “to obtain 
the rectification or erasure of such data.”296 In other words, an individual 
should have a remedy when a government has collected, stored, or 
disseminated that individual’s data wrongfully. 
Schrems’s emphasis on procedure suggests that there may be a sliding 
scale with respect to the relationship between substantive and procedural 
rights and some flexibility within the category of procedural rights.297 
The Schrems court might in future cases tolerate more substantive 
flexibility for U.S. intelligence collection on EU residents in exchange 
for tighter procedural safeguards. The prospect of independent review, 
even on a more relaxed substantive standard, would discipline U.S. 
intelligence agencies, reducing the prospect of egregious intrusions on 
privacy. The salutary discipline provided by procedural safeguards might 
assure the CJEU that the rule of law would be observed, permitting a 
more relaxed reading of the substantive strict-necessity standard. Broader 
machine collection accompanied by robust restrictions on analysts’ 
access to and use of data might pass muster. That trade-off might actually 
work better than insisting on a specific level of both substantive and 
                                                                                                                     
 293. See id. at 22 (explaining that the “total number of individuals targeted under Section 
702 in 2013 was 92,707, a tiny fraction of total EU or global Internet users”).  
 294. Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Comm’r, 2014 E.C.R. 
 295. Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-33.  
 296. Id. 
 297. In a familiar example of a sliding scale, courts trade off the irreparability of harm, 
balance of hardships between the parties, and probability of success on the merits in considering 
whether to grant a preliminary injunction. See Dataphase Sys. v. CL Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th 
Cir. 1981); Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485, 
487 (2010) (discussing the balance of equities test); cf. MATTHEW BENDER, 13 MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 65.22(5)(b)–(i) (2015) (analyzing tests in different federal appellate tribunals). 
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procedural safeguards. Moreover, independence in review mechanisms 
could be subject to a sliding scale. Administrative, as opposed to judicial 
review, would be appropriate if the administrative review came with 
appropriate guarantees of independence, the power to obtain necessary 
information from intelligence agencies in the course of providing 
oversight, and the authority to provide necessary relief to enforce 
compliance with legal requirements.298 
In February, 2016, the EU and the United States announced a new 
proposed data-sharing agreement, Privacy Shield, with greater clarity on 
U.S. substantive and procedural protections of personal data.299 In the 
new agreement, the U.S. pledged to create an Office of the 
Ombudsperson in the State Department to respond to EU complaints 
about data privacy.300 As a State Department official, the proposed 
ombudsperson would be officially separated from intelligence agencies 
in other U.S. cabinet departments. That separation is an encouraging sign 
in establishing the independence that Schrems mandated. However, like 
all State Department officials, the ombudsperson would serve at the 
pleasure of the President. Moreover, the February, 2016 proposal was 
vague about the precise powers of the ombudsperson, including her 
access to U.S. intelligence data.301 Clear description of such powers 
would be a threshold condition for Privacy Shield’s compliance with 
Schrems.302   
b.  Zakharov v. Russia: Putin as the Elephant in the Room 
The ECHR’s decision in Zakharov v. Russia,  unlike Schrems, deals 
directly with the national security and law enforcement regimes of a 
particular state.303 The ECHR in Zakharov reiterated its overarching view 
                                                                                                                     
 298. See Zakharov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 147 (2015) (noting that under CJEU case 
law review can be by either a “court or by an independent administrative body”).  
 299. See EC Adequacy Decision, supra note 35; Letter from Robert S. Litt, Gen’l Counsel, 
Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to Justin S. Antonipillai, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce and Ted 
Dean, Dep. Ass’t Sec’y, Int’l Trade Admin. (Feb. 22, 2016) (hereinafter ODNI Letter), http://ec.e 
uropa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision-annex-6_en.pdf. 
 300. See EC Adequacy Decision, supra note 36, at 26. 
 301. This vagueness spurred criticism of the proposed Privacy Shield agreement by EU data 
protection officials. See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, Opinion 01/2016 on the 
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Draft Adequacy Decision (Apr. 13, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2016/wp238_en.pdf.  
 302. Both the ECHR and the CJEU have found in a different context—the fairness of 
procedures for designating individuals as terrorist financiers and blocking their assets—that an 
ombudsperson is not a substitute for more formal judicial review. See Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland, 
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 2016); Kadi v. Eur. Comm’n (European Court of Justice 2013). 
 303. See Zakharov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 1, 3 (2015) (“The applicant alleged that 
the system of secret interception of mobile telephone communications in Russia violated his right 
to respect for his private life and correspondence and that he did not have any effective remedy in 
 
58
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss4/3
2016] SURVEILLANCE BY ALGORITHM 1103 
 
that states are entitled to a “margin of appreciation” from the courts on 
the validity of national security surveillance.304 In finding that Russia’s 
provisions for domestic surveillance did not comply with Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the ECHR relied on factors that 
are specific to Vladimir Putin’s Russia.305 Although some have read 
Zakharov as having broader implications,306 the court’s holding flows 
largely from glaring flaws in the Russian framework for review of 
domestic surveillance requests. 
The Russian framework found wanting in Zakharov combined a 
robust capacity on the part of Russian authorities to access virtually all 
domestic telecommunications data307 with very weak oversight of how 
law enforcement exercised that capacity. As the court noted, the Russian 
statute expressly bars a court considering surveillance requests from 
asking law enforcement authorities for information about undercover 
operatives or police informants or about how authorities will execute a 
particular search.308 These limits on independent oversight effectively 
made a law enforcement agency the judge of its own case. Deprived of 
the power to seek information about the reliability of informants or the 
actual conduct of a proposed search, the reviewing court lacked 
“sufficient factual basis” for effective oversight.309 Moreover, although 
the ECHR noted that the Russian Constitutional Court had held that a 
reviewing court must find at least a “reasonable suspicion” that a criminal 
offense has been committed,310 Russian law and practice did not require 
that courts of general jurisdiction follow this decision.311  
 
                                                                                                                     
that respect.”). 
 304. Id. at para. 232.  
 305. Id. at paras. 302–05 (“It is significant that the shortcomings in the legal framework as 
identified above appear to have an impact on the actual operation of the system of secret 
surveillance which exists in Russia.”). Shortly after Zakharov, the ECHR reached a similar 
decision regarding surveillance in Hungary, a former Iron Curtain state with a legal system that 
suffers from fundamental flaws comparable to Russia’s. See Szabo v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2016). 
 306. See Carly Nyst, European Human Rights Court Deals a Heavy Blow to the Lawfulness 
of Bulk Surveillance, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 9, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/282 
16/echr-deals-heavy-blow-lawfulness-bulk-surveillance/ (suggesting parallels between Russian 
and United Kingdom surveillance programs); Lorna Woods, Zakharov v. Russia: Mass 
Surveillance and the European Court of Human Rights, EU L. ANALYSIS (Dec. 16, 2015), http://e 
ulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/12/zakharov-v-russia-mass-surveillance-and.html (same).  
 307. Zakharov, at paras. 111, 116 (discussing “remote-control” access to data by law 
enforcement agencies). 
 308. Id. at paras. 37, 261. 
 309. Id. at para. 261. 
 310. Id. at para. 262. 
 311. Id. at para. 263.  
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The ECHR found that the actual practice of Russian courts entailed 
merely pro forma review.312 The ECHR noted that law enforcement 
agency requests routinely lacked any supporting materials, that courts 
“never” requested such materials, and that a mere passing “reference” to 
national security justifying a search was usually enough to grant a law 
enforcement agency’s request.313 Moreover, law enforcement authorities 
were not required to show the pro forma approval to telecommunications 
providers before conducting surveillance.314 This Potemkin village 
version of oversight, according to the ECHR, all too predictably led to 
rampant “arbitrary and abusive surveillance practices.”315 The Russian 
judge on the ECHR, Judge Dmitry Dedov, concurred in the majority’s 
assessment, observing that a “widespread suspicion” is prevalent among 
Russia’s population that surveillance extends to “human-rights activists, 
opposition activists and leaders, journalists,” and all others “involved in 
public affairs.”316  
This focus on the special problems posed by Putin’s despotic security 
apparatus limits Zakharov’s utility as a template for analysis of 
surveillance systems in European democracies. However, insistence on 
crucial safeguards such as independent review will likely figure in those 
future decisions.  
B.  Deferential Proportionality and Article 17 of the ICCPR 
To fashion a standard for assessing a state’s machine surveillance, one 
can combine arguments for reasonable, but not absolute, deference to 
Article 17’s language, which bars “arbitrary” intrusions on privacy.317 
Some form of proportionality review is common in international and 
human rights cases and may also apply in the case of Article 17.318 The 
                                                                                                                     
 312. The ECHR made these findings without expressly mentioning the elephant in the room: 
Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose commitment to legal niceties such as the separation of 
powers is open to question. However, that unspoken presence is an important element of 
Zakharov’s context. That element is absent in pending surveillance cases involving the United 
Kingdom or other states, whatever the excesses.  
 313. Zakharov, at para. 263. 
 314. Id. at para. 269. 
 315. Id. at para. 303. 
 316. Id. at pt. 4 (Dedov, J., concurring). 
 317. See CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), U.N. Human Rts. 
Comm., The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of 
Honour and Reputation, 32d Sess., para. 1 (Apr. 8, 1988). 
 318. The Human Rights Committee, which is designated by the United Nations to receive 
reports from member states on compliance with the ICCPR, has recently advised the United States 
that intrusions on privacy are subject to “the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity.” 
ICCPR, supra note 7, at 10; cf. Emmerson, supra note 12, at 16 & n.34 (discussing 
proportionality). To comply with the legality requirement, states must provide individuals with 
some level of guidance about the state’s surveillance practices, although states need not provide 
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applicable level of proportionality review should be flexible while 
remaining cognizant of core privacy protections.  
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, commonly 
understood meanings of the term “arbitrary” should inform the type of 
proportionality review applied.319 Dictionaries define the term “arbitrary” 
as referring to an action or decision that is “capricious, unreasonable, [or] 
unsupported.”320 While this definition does not preclude application of a 
proportionality standard, it suggests that the standard applied must be 
capacious enough to uphold a range of reasonable state decisions.321  
A deferential account of proportionality would be consistent with 
Article 17’s arbitrariness standard and with the reasons for deference 
outlined above.322 For an example of a deferential application of 
proportionality, consider the ECHR’s decision in Zana v. Turkey323 
interpreting the European Convention’s free speech provision, Article 
10.324 Article 10 expressly permits content-related curbs on free speech 
when those are necessary to protect national security and public safety.325 
The court upheld the criminal conviction of a public official who had 
described the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish insurgent 
group, as “legitimate”—Turkey and other states, including the United 
States, designate the PKK as a terrorist organization.326 The ECHR cited 
“serious disturbances” relating to Kurdish insurgency in Turkey.327 
Moreover, the court interpreted necessity in a relaxed fashion. Even 
                                                                                                                     
notice that will allow targets of surveillance to “adapt” their behavior and thereby frustrate state 
efforts. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 152 (2010). 
 319. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.  
 320. See David Sloss, Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 
18 n.76 (2006). 
 321. Cf. Paust, supra note 245, at 633–34 (viewing proportionality as reasonable balancing 
of rights and “just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society” (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810, at art. 1 (1948))). 
 322. For an example of such a standard, see Martin Lutern, The Lost Meaning of 
Proportionality, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, 
REASONING 21, 34 & n.39 (Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller & Gregoire Webber eds., 2014) 
(discussing the need for the ECHR to show deference in terrorism-related cases brought under the 
European Convention on Human Rights to minimize future violations of human rights by non-
state actors; the European Convention, tellingly, does not expressly include the ICCPR’s 
arbitrariness language but, according to the author, should nonetheless be read as incorporating a 
relaxed proportionality standard); cf. id. at 35 (noting the frequency of cases that hinge on “many 
subjective features of particular states and societies, of which a reviewing court (especially an 
international court) will have no significant knowledge”).  
 323. 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 667 (1997). 
 324. Id. at 678–81. 
 325. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 274, at 11.  
 326. Zana, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 667–68, 679. 
 327. Id. at 688. 
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though the official’s statement in support of the PKK was ambiguous, 
since the official opposed the targeting of civilians, the court viewed his 
conviction as “necessary” to deal with the “pressing social need.”328 
Citing the margin of appreciation, the EHCR held that preventing speech 
favorable to terrorist groups was “proportionate” to legitimate state 
aims.329 The ECHR arrived at this conclusion despite the absence of 
evidence that the speech at issue caused any concrete violence.330 A 
similar standard should apply to overseas machine surveillance. 
C.  Applying the Deferential Proportionality Standard 
Even a relaxed proportionality standard should have some bite. 
Absolute deference would provide no check on the false positives that 
rightly worry privacy advocates. To address this concern, machine 
surveillance should be tailored to compelling state purposes, 
scientifically validated, and subject to independent review. This Section 
discusses each safeguard in turn. 
1.  The Purpose of Machine Surveillance  
A deferential proportionality inquiry on machine surveillance would 
regard national security as an adequate justification. This would include 
machine surveillance for the purposes listed in PPD-28: counterterrorism, 
counterespionage, antiproliferation of WMDs, cybersecurity, 
international crime, and sanctions evasion.331 Moreover, a deferential 
proportionality standard would reject the equivalency thesis’s conflation 
of a state’s own nationals (or others within its borders) with persons 
abroad. Instead, a deferential reading of proportionality would credit a 
state’s need to engage in surveillance abroad,332 particularly given the 
                                                                                                                     
 328. Id. at 690–91. 
 329. Id. at 691. 
 330. In citing Zana, this Article in no way suggests that the United States should second-
guess the more robust protections built into the First Amendment. See Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010) (holding that Congress could prohibit speech directed by or 
coordinated with foreign terrorist groups, but observing that the First Amendment protects speech 
involving domestic groups as well as speech that is independent of foreign terrorist organizations). 
The Article’s sole point is to illustrate how the ECHR has applied a deferential proportionality 
standard.   
 331. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 159 (2010) (accepting 
“national security” as an adequate justification for surveillance and noting that requiring more 
specific justification might impair states’ efforts to safeguard national security). But see Frank La 
Rue (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶ 53–54, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 
2013) (cautioning about unduly broad use of national security as justification for surveillance); 
Emmerson, supra note 12, ¶¶ 11–13 (same).  
 332. See Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 84. 
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difficulties of tracking overseas threats and the risk that terrorists will find 
safe havens in other countries. The ECHR case law also suggests that 
machine access to a substantial database of communications content may 
be appropriate as long as human access is restricted.333 This principle 
would cover directed searches tailored to terrorism and autonomous 
searches based on data sets dealing with terrorism as long as those 
searches were properly validated.  
However, a state could not engage in untrammeled bulk collection of 
content, even if human access were limited. Such untrammeled collection 
would be problematic under both the deontological and consequential 
branches of the first equivalency thesis. In a deontological sense, 
unfettered machine searches would undermine the perception of control 
that persons abroad have a right to expect. On a consequential level, 
unbridled access could cause harm given the amount of incorrect 
information in searched databases and human analysts’ unawareness of 
or indifference to this problem.334  
In an effort to accommodate LOAC, states would be allowed to use 
machine searches in other countries that are the site of an armed conflict 
involving the state conducting surveillance. That would authorize the 
United States to engage in bulk collection of content throughout 
Afghanistan. In countries without an armed conflict, a state would only 
be able to engage in more tailored bulk collection of content linked to a 
particular geographic area within that country where evidence indicated 
a substantial terrorist presence and where more targeted techniques 
indicated a spike in terrorist activity. In the Bahamas, for example, the 
United States could target drug or human traffickers, but it could not 
collect in bulk all other Bahamian communications content. Complying 
with this standard would represent a change from current reported U.S. 
policy. However, that change would be worthwhile in confirming the 
United States’ devotion to constraints mandated by international human 
rights.  
2.  Reliability  
A valid purpose for a search is of little help if the search is unreliable. 
Searches that are unreliable will yield too many false positives and thus 
intrude unduly on innocent individuals. Validation is necessary to avoid 
                                                                                                                     
 333. See id. at para. 32 (noting that German authorities used keywords to search 
communications content).  
 334. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1152 (D. Or. 2014) (discussing “a 2009 report 
by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General that concluded that the TSDB 
contains many errors and that the TSC has failed to take adequate steps to remove or to modify 
records in a timely manner even when necessary”). 
 
63
Margulies: Surveillance By Algorithm: The NSA, Computerized Intelligence Col
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1108 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
this risk.335 However, criteria for the reliability of machine searches 
should respect the transparency paradox, which holds that transparency 
in substantive explanations reduces the accuracy of the search.  
Since autonomous search strategies such as neural networks or 
support vector machines use hidden layers to boost accuracy,336 requiring 
a substantive explanation would entail foregoing the accuracy that hidden 
layers produce. That is a bad bargain. Instead of requiring analysts to 
dumb down searches, human rights law should permit analysts to offer a 
methodological explanation of their chosen search strategy. In other 
words, officials can justify their search by explaining the technical basis 
for the search and the criteria analysts have employed to validate the 
search technique. One could argue that a substantive, verbal test is 
important for other reasons: it requires officials to explain and justify 
their decisions, permits easy review of search criteria, and offers guidance 
for the public. In the domestic realm, parting with these attributes would 
be unwise and illegal. However, pivoting to a methodological explanation 
for overseas collection does not clash with the U.S. Constitution or 
human rights norms. Indeed, by promoting more accurate searches, 
permitting methodological explanations ensures that searches will be less 
arbitrary. At least in the overseas realm, that trade-off is worthwhile.337 
The methodology used in the search requires validation. A search 
should yield more true positives (needles spotted in the haystack) than 
alternative methods, while limiting the number of false positives 
(handfuls of hay). In the national security surveillance context, the stakes 
are higher: false negatives that should have been spotted are terrorists 
who can commit acts of violence, while false positives who were 
mistakenly tracked do not merely promote inefficiency but constitute 
intrusions on individual privacy. Statisticians have developed a wealth of 
indicia to assess the accuracy of a search.338 Four of these are precision 
(the number of true positives among the number of predicted positives); 
recall (the number of true positives identified as such by the search 
compared with the number of actual positives, including those not 
                                                                                                                     
 335. See Hu, supra note 143, at 808–16 (discussing the Daubert standard). 
 336. See supra Subsection I.C.2.a.ii. 
 337. Granting states the flexibility to use methodological, not substantive, explanations for 
overseas computer searches is consistent with what Professor Paul Berman has called global legal 
pluralism. For more detail on global legal pluralism, see generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL 
LEGAL PLURALISM (2012) (examining the difficulties of a legal pluralistic world where multiple 
legal regimes imposed by state, sub-state, transnational, supranational, and non-state communities 
may regulate one person); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 
(2007) (recognizing that the existence of multiple, overlapping legal regimes causes conflict but 
arguing that this conflict can be beneficial to produce alternative ideas and provide a forum for 
communication among multiple communities).  
 338. See FLACH, supra note 80, at 56; WITTEN, supra note 1, at 174–77 (discussing various 
methods used to evaluate false positive versus false negative trade-off).  
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identified); the false negative rate for positives (the number of false 
negatives as a proportion of the total number of actual positives); and the 
false positive rate for negatives (the “false alarm” rate—the number of 
false positives as a proportion of the total number of actual negatives). 
Statisticians can plot these criteria against each other for a more refined 
assessment.  
To illustrate precision and recall, consider a stylized example. 
Suppose software engineers have developed a program for recognizing 
celebrities on the streets of New York. Analysts test the program on a day 
in which an inordinate number of celebrities are present, such as Saturday 
Night Live’s fortieth-anniversary bash. A video of Fifth Avenue includes 
nine actual celebrities, such as Beyoncé, Jay Z, and Kim Kardashian, 
along with dozens of anonymous pedestrians. The program identifies 
seven celebrities. Four of the identifications are correct, but three of the 
persons labeled as celebrities are actually random passers-by. The 
program’s precision is 4/7, while its recall is 4/9.  
This example highlights a challenge noted previously for machine 
searches for terrorists, as opposed to celebrities: the availability of 
adequate data. The celebrities are already identified. There may be 
questions at the margins, such as people who used to be celebrities but 
are now forgotten, or people who may be celebrities tomorrow but are 
still part of the pack today. At the core, however, good data exists, based 
on web searches, social media mentions, and the like. On the other hand,  
ISIS recruits cannot necessarily be individually identified; if they could, 
counterterrorism would be easier than it is. Indeed, identifying previously 
unknown terrorists is a prime purpose of machine searches. That creates 
a problem, at least for the recall criterion, which requires knowledge of 
the number of actual positives in the relevant statistical universe.339 So 
the lack of data, which is a problem for the efficacy of a national security 
machine search in the first instance is also a problem in assessing the 
efficacy of the search.  
Analysts can work around this obstacle by comparing machine 
searches to each other and to other search methods, using measures such 
as the false negative rate for positives and the false positive rate for 
negatives (the “false alarm” rate). For example, analysts could calculate 
such rates for a search based only on human intelligence sources, such as 
informants. Analysts could do similar calculations for the results of 
directed searches that used identifiers such as phone numbers to trace the 
contacts of suspected terrorists. Finally, analysts could compare the 
results for autonomous searches using hidden layers in a neural network.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 339. See WITTEN, supra note 1, at 175.  
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False positives are likely to occur in human intelligence and in both 
types of machine searches. The human intelligence search relies on 
informants, who often have agendas of their own that can compromise 
accuracy.340 For their part, directed searches include all contacts of 
suspected terrorists and sometimes (as in the Patriot Act domestic 
metadata program) include more “hops” (the contacts of the terrorists’ 
contacts, once or twice removed).341 False positives are certain here: 
suspected terrorists may talk to lawyers, journalists, and dry-cleaners, as 
well as other terrorists, and the terrorists’ contacts (and the contacts of 
their contacts) may talk to even more innocent parties. Because of the 
difficulty of getting data to fuel autonomous searches, false positives are 
certain here as well. Nevertheless, an autonomous search might result in 
fewer false positives than other approaches.  
Settling on one formula for validation would undermine the deference 
owed to the state conducting surveillance. Nevertheless, a couple of 
observations are in order. As a general matter, each search in the order 
listed (human, directed, and autonomous) should have a successively 
higher cumulative recall rate. In other words, a directed search should 
uncover actual positives missed by human intelligence, and an 
autonomous search should reveal actual positives missed in the sum of 
the first two searches. At the same time, the false positive rate for 
negatives (the “false alarm” rate: false positives as a proportion of total 
actual negatives) should remain within two standard deviations of the 
previous search for each successive search. Again, this approach is not 
the only appropriate validation strategy, but it suggests an overall 
approach that would comply with human rights norms. 
3.  Review  
Another cornerstone in the human rights architecture of surveillance is 
review by an independent body. Review includes several elements, 
including independence, notice to those potentially affected by 
surveillance, rules regarding retention of irrelevant information, and 
redress for those whose information was collected or retained arbitrarily. 
This Article addresses each in turn. 
a.  Independence 
The biggest post-Snowden development in human rights law 
regarding surveillance has been the CJEU’s insistence on independent 
                                                                                                                     
 340. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth 
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 937 n.89 (1999) (“Most prosecutors 
distinguish informants from cooperators and believe that informants have even greater incentives 
to lie than cooperators because, not only are they ‘working off’ cases, but their entire livelihood 
is dependent on the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).”).  
 341. See Kris, supra note 51, at 219 (explaining “hops”).  
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review of data retention and access in Schrems and Digital Rights 
Ireland.342 The CJEU did not specifically address national security 
surveillance, ruling only that the comprehensive EU data retention regime 
violated fundamental rights.343 However, in its ruling, the court 
highlighted the importance of independent review.344 Indeed, the CJEU 
found that “automatic processing” of data created an additional risk of 
abuse in the absence of independently enforced safeguards on access to 
the information retained.345 This emphasis on independent scrutiny has 
featured prominently in European human rights cases. In Kennedy v. 
United Kingdom,346 the ECHR noted that the United Kingdom had 
established an Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), which the ruling 
party protects from interference.347 In Weber v. Germany, the ECHR 
noted that Germany relies on an independent agency, the G10, to review 
surveillance.348  
The United States provides for independent judicial review of most 
domestic law enforcement searches and has done so since the 
Constitution’s enactment, but that framework has two gaps, one serious 
and one bridgeable. The bridgeable gap is the absence of prior review 
                                                                                                                     
 342. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-22 (“The establishment 
in Member States of independent supervisory authorities is . . . an essential component of the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.” (internal citations 
omitted)); Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Comm’r, 2014 E.C.R 
para. 62 (disapproving of Directive 2006/24 because “access by the competent national authorities 
to the data retained is not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an 
independent administrative body”).  
 343. See Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, 2014 E.C.R. at para. 
34.  
 344. See id. at 62 (stressing the need to provide for “prior review” by a court or an 
“independent administrative body”). 
 345. See id. at paras. 54–55. Other cases in European national courts have followed the 
CJEU’s lead. See Davis v. Home Sec’y, No. CO/3365/2014, [2015] EWHC (Admin) 2092 [para. 
91(c)] (Royal Ct. of Justice London Div. 2015); see also Case C-362/14, Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. 
at I-32 (citing DRI in observing that EU–U.S. Safe Harbor regime, which allows corporations on 
both sides of the Atlantic to self-certify that they are observing privacy rules, is problematic in 
light of revelations about U.S. surveillance); cf. id. at I-28 (finding a lack of authority to invalidate 
the Safe Harbor program and referring the matter to CJEU); Nikolaj Nielsen, French Court Backs 
Mass Surveillance, EUROBSERVER (July 24, 2015, 9:26 AM), https://euobserver.com/justice/1297 
60 (reporting on the French decision); Sam Schechner & Matthew Dalton, French Constituonal 
Court Approves New Powers for Intelligence Services, WALL STREET J. (July 24, 2015, 5:40 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/french-constitutional-court-approves-new-powers-for-intelligence-s 
ervices-1437730809 (discussing France’s constitutional court decision that allows intelligence 
services broad powers to spy).   
 346. 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 (2010). 
 347. Id. at para. 232. A UK bill pending as of January 6, 2016, added a layer of judicial 
review. See Shaheed Fatima, The “Snooper’s Charter” and Judicial Oversight, JUST SECURITY 
(Dec. 21, 2015, 9:40 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28443/snoopers-charter-judicial-
oversight/.  
 348. Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 25. The G10 has a mixed membership, 
including a former judge and members of Parliament. Id.  
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under Section 702, which concerns targeted surveillance. The FISC 
reviews certifications from the Executive Branch under Section 702 but 
does not approve particular selectors in advance of their use.349 On 
balance, this is not a fatal flaw from a human rights perspective. A 
number of ECHR cases have upheld surveillance regimes that did not 
include prior review,350 and the need for speed in exigent national security 
contexts351 surely demonstrates the undue burden that prior review would 
cause. 
The other more serious gap concerns U.S. bulk collection under EO 
12,333.352 The FISC does not review this collection, which Congress has 
consigned solely to the Executive Branch subject to a presidential 
finding.353 An interagency body reviews collection under EO 12,333, but 
that does not provide the independence that human rights precedents 
require. The State Department ombudsperson created under the new 
U.S.–EU Privacy Shield agreement354 may fall short in independence, 
because that individual serves at the pleasure of the President. To fill this 
gap, either Congress should empower the FISC to engage in this review, 
aided by a public advocate who would push back against the Executive 
Branch’s arguments,355 or the President or Congress should set up an 
independent board to perform the task, with the board’s members 
removable by the President only “for cause.”356 Without this 
                                                                                                                     
 349. 50 U.S.C. § 1801a(e)(2) (2012). 
 350. E.g., Kennedy, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. paras. 79–80 (upholding a regime in which a cabinet 
ministry issues warrants for its own investigations). 
 351. U.S. courts have recognized this issue in crafting a foreign intelligence exception to the 
warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 341 (3rd Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10–CR–
00475–KI–1, 2014 WL 2866749, at *15 (D. Or. June 24, 2014); In re Directives Pursuant to 
Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 
2008); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), at 424 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) 
(celebrating the Executive’s virtue of “dispatch”). 
 352. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra note 45.  
 354. See supra notes 299–302 and accompanying text. 
 355. See Lederman & Vladeck, supra note 16. 
 356. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84 
(2010) (invalidating removal restrictions on members of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board within the Securities and Exchange Commission). This level of independence 
might well be consistent with the ECHR case law, which has approved Germany’s reliance on the 
G10; the G10 is not fully independent of politics, because it includes members of Germany’s 
parliament. See Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 25. Departmental inspectors 
general (IGs) can provide another kind of independent check, although IGs’ role entails 
assessment of programs, not review of particular decisions. Because IGs issue reports to Congress, 
they have a constituency in another branch of government that insulates them in part from 
executive branch pressure. Cf. Emily Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 88 (2014) (noting the importance of IGs in assessment of FBI’s role in 
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comprehensive commitment to independent scrutiny, U.S. overseas 
surveillance will suffer from a significant vulnerability under human 
rights norms.  
b.  Notice  
Notice is important to review, since potentially aggrieved parties need 
notice to seek recourse from an independent body. The international law 
principle of legality also enshrines notice in a broader sense, requiring 
that members of a polity know before the fact of actions governments 
may take that adversely affect their interests.357 Moreover, in human 
rights law, notice and legality require some degree of formality in the 
enactment of policy. Policy should be written, not made on the fly 
through furtive official conversations. Nonetheless, a state need not 
provide every subject of an investigation with notice that she is under 
surveillance, since such broad notice would provide suspects with a road 
map of law enforcement efforts.358 Snowden’s revelations, by pushing 
states toward greater transparency, have moved the dial toward 
compliance with the notice prong of human rights law.   
In Britain, the IPT found that Britain had violated provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights prior to the Snowden 
disclosures.359 However, in the wake of Snowden’s disclosures, the IPT 
concluded that Britain’s surveillance framework passed muster.360 While 
recent statutory changes that broadened surveillance powers may change 
                                                                                                                     
domestic intelligence-gathering); Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without 
Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 94–95 (2014) (suggesting that privacy 
and civil liberties officers within executive departments can provide different perspective that 
influences policy); DeLong, supra note 182, at 86–88 (discussing importance of internalizing 
compliance within intelligence agencies dealing with large-scale data analysis). 
 357. This principle is clearest when the government seeks to criminalize conduct. Since 
fundamental fairness requires that individuals have an opportunity to conform their conduct to 
law, both the principle of legality and the U.S. Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 10, bar punishment for conduct that preceded enactment of a statutory prohibition. 
As the text explains, once the state meets this requirement, it need not provide specific notice to 
each individual who may be subject to surveillance for violating a duly enacted law.  
 358. Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 135 (observing that “notification might reveal the 
working methods and fields of operation of the Intelligence Service” and that “the very absence 
of knowledge of surveillance . . . ensures the efficacy” of the surveillance effort); see also Paul 
M. Schwartz, German and U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal Regulation of Domestic 
Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 776 (2003) (observing that under European 
law secrecy is appropriate if “interests of the State justified secrecy”); but see Sudha Setty, 
Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Accountability, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 69 
(2015) (warning that secrecy can insulate government overreaching from effective review). 
 359. See Liberty & Others v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2015] 
UKIPTrib 13 77-H para. 23, http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/Liberty_Ors_Judgment_6Feb15.pdf.  
 360. Id. at paras. 22–23. 
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that assessment, as a British court recently held,361 at least Britain’s new 
law was the product of open debate.  
In the United States, official public documents outlining 
implementation of PPD-28 provide notice of machine access overseas.362 
The PPD-28 documents articulate—in a fashion that is unprecedented in 
its candor regarding intelligence collection—that the United States 
engages in bulk collection, as well as scanning, of transnational 
material.363 The U.S. documents’ discussion of “SIGINT [signals 
intelligence] data that is temporarily acquired to facilitate targeted 
collection”364 signals to any reasonably attentive reader that the United 
States is using machines to scan international communications. The PPD-
28 documents also reveal the purposes served by U.S. bulk collection 
abroad, such as counterterrorism, counterespionage, antiproliferation, 
and transnational crime.365 With some fairly modest steps, the United 
States has leapt to the head of the class on notice. More is unnecessary, 
particularly given legitimate concerns about tipping off terrorists.   
c.  Recourse 
Notice to an individual subject of inappropriate surveillance is part of 
the recourse that human rights law requires for victims of government 
overreaching.366 Recourse, which should entail an independent decision 
maker,367 is especially important for machine access because of the risk 
that mining multiple databases will compound input errors (as the saying 
goes, “Garbage in, garbage out”).368 That has happened in the case of no-
fly lists,369 and it is a risk in other contexts as well.  
The United States needs to improve its avenues for recourse. 
Currently, recourse in the national security surveillance space is 
exceedingly limited.370 No independent agency exists to field complaints, 
and standing doctrine restricts remedies in federal courts.371 The Judicial 
                                                                                                                     
 361. See Davis v. Home Sec’y, No. CO/3365/2014, [2015] EWHC (Admin) 2092 [para. 91] 
(Royal Ct. of Justice London Div. 2015). 
 362. See PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 7 n.1 (defining bulk collection). 
 363. Id. at 7–8. 
 364. Id. at 7 n.2. 
 365. Id. at 7–8; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B) (2012) (permitting limited collection of 
foreign intelligence information related to “foreign affairs” of United States); supra notes 283–93 
and accompanying text (discussing “foreign affairs” prong of Section 702). 
 366. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. paras. 79–80 (2010). 
 367. See id. at para. 127.  
 368. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 76, 274–75. 
 369. See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141–42 (D. Or. 2014). 
 370. See Margulies, supra note 8, at 2163.  
 371. See Clapper v. Amnesty, Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149–50 (2013) (narrowly 
construing the standing requirement for recourse in federal courts); cf. Obama v. Klayman, 800 
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Redress Act enhances recourse.372 This legislation extends protections in 
the U.S. Privacy Act to non-U.S. persons outside the United States who 
are nationals of states that agree to share information with the United 
States for law enforcement purposes and provide “appropriate privacy 
protections” for such information.373 The Privacy Act furnishes a 
mechanism for individuals to gain access to government data or records 
about them and seek judicial remedies for denying individuals such 
access or engaging in improper collection, storage, or use of such data.374 
However, like the Privacy Act, the Judicial Redress Act exempts data 
collected, acquired, or stored for law enforcement375 or national 
security376 purposes.377 These categorical exemptions undermine the 
Judicial Redress Act’s utility as an avenue for recourse.378 While the 
ombudsperson established by the new Privacy Shield agreement may aid 
in promoting recourse, the CJEU has in a prior case viewed an 
ombudsperson as an inadequate cure for procedural deficits.379 
Recognition of this weakness can readily coexist with the 
understanding that law enforcement and national security necessarily 
impose some limits on recourse. Law enforcement and national security 
needs will shape the contours of government agencies’ responses to 
queries from individuals. In Britain, for example, the IPT provides 
recourse, while ensuring that its decisions do not allow terrorists to “game 
plan” attempts to elude surveillance. When the IPT rejects a complaint, it 
informs the complainant with characteristic British concision that “no 
determination has been made in his favour.”380 That sparse 
pronouncement is sufficient under human rights law.381 A similar finding 
in a U.S. tribunal would not jeopardize the U.S. intelligence apparatus.  
                                                                                                                     
F.3d 559, 561–62, (D.C. Cir. 2015) (vacating the preliminary injunction and remanding for further 
proceedings on the ground that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on 
standing to challenge government surveillance policies, since the plaintiffs had not shown a 
sufficiently high probability that they had been subject to surveillance).  
 372. Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
552a note).  
 373. Id. § 2(d). 
 374. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)–(g) (2012). 
 375. See id. § 552a(k)(2).  
 376. See id. § 552(b)(1).  
 377. See H.R. 1428, § 2(a)(1) (incorporating by reference exemptions in the Privacy Act). 
 378. If the Judicial Redress Act does not provide adequate recourse, then European data 
commissioners and the European Court of Justice may not approve revisions to regimes such as 
“Safe Harbor,” which permitted companies on both sides of the Atlantic to share customer data 
to facilitate commercial transactions. 
 379. See Joined Cases C-584/10, C-593/10 & C-595/10, Kadi v. European Commission 
(European Court of Justice 18 July 2013) (holding that ombudsperson was not sufficient to cure 
procedural flaws in regime for blocking assets of suspected terrorist financiers).   
 380. Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 79 (2010). 
 381. See id. 
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Of course, a finding for a complainant might reveal that, on occasion, 
U.S. intelligence agencies make mistakes. However, freely 
acknowledging missteps might actually bolster the United States’ 
standing around the globe. Thanks to the PPD-28 process initiated by 
President Obama, transparency has reinvigorated the United States’ 
stance on intelligence collection overseas. Independent recourse would 
be consistent with this salutary trend.  
CONCLUSION 
Anger was a common reaction in the United States and abroad to 
Edward Snowden’s disclosures. Some indignation against government is 
healthy in a democracy. However, indignation can polarize positions and 
obscure nuance that makes debate productive. In analyzing machine 
surveillance, this Article has endeavored to redress the balance. 
Two camps have battled over the scope of state machine surveillance 
abroad. The state-centric camp argues that human rights agreements such 
as the ICCPR do not even apply and that machine access is inherently 
unintrusive. Surveillance critics respond with the three-pronged 
equivalency thesis: machine and human access are equivalent invasions 
of privacy, a state’s technological capabilities drive surveillance practice, 
and legal protections must be equivalent for both a state’s nationals and 
non-nationals overseas. Each approach is flawed. 
The state-centric camp is wrong about the applicability of human 
rights agreements, which have extra-territorial effect. It is also in part 
wrong about machine access, which can wreak both deontological and 
consequential harm. However, the equivalency thesis also misses the 
mark. While machine access can be problematic, safeguards can ease the 
problem and ensure that law governs a state’s capabilities. Moreover, 
international law, including Security Council resolutions combating ISIS 
and Al Qaeda, permits surveillance abroad that will prevent terrorist 
groups from gaining safe havens, even when that surveillance is more 
intrusive than domestic surveillance efforts.  
Machine searches are a powerful tool, but surveillance critics are right 
that they are not a panacea. Safeguards are needed to channel their 
benefits and reduce the risk of abuse abroad. Because of the need to 
accommodate Security Council resolutions, LOAC, and privacy–privacy 
trade-offs, along with the margin of appreciation that courts have usually 
accorded states and the ICCPR’s loose arbitrariness standard, a 
deferential proportionality test should govern the search for safeguards. 
This standard, as applied to machine searches abroad, has three pillars: 
purpose, reliability, and review.  
The purpose of surveillance must be exigent, such as national security, 
although human rights decisions demonstrate that states need not cite 
more specific purposes that would tip off terrorists. Nevertheless, a 
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national security purpose creates some clear baselines. For example, 
while a state can engage in bulk collection of content in another country 
involved in an armed conflict with the collecting state, bulk collection of 
all of a country’s communications content is inappropriate outside the 
sphere of armed conflict. In other words, the United States should permit 
jet ski enthusiasts in the Bahamas to arrange their transportation without 
a machine listening to the call, unless U.S. law enforcement has evidence 
that the jet skis will be used for terrorism or the transport of drugs to 
another country.  
Each state should validate machine searches. Validation can replace 
the substantive verbal explanation that the transparency paradox 
precludes. In addition, validation should involve commonly accepted 
metrics, such as precision and recall. Machine searches should 
demonstrate their worth in finding false negatives without excessive false 
positives. If machines cannot meet this standard, older methods, such as 
human informants, should be used.  
Review should be independent, as the CJEU stressed in Schrems. In 
the United States, courts issue domestic warrants, ensure that domestic 
metadata collected under the Patriot Act and queried by analysts has 
reasonable and articulable links to terrorism, and review targeted 
collection under FISA’s Section 702. The FISC should have a public 
advocate who pushes back against government surveillance requests. 
Moreover, an independent board or agency should review bulk collection 
under EO 12,333. In addition, an independent agency should review 
complaints from individuals who assert that the government wrongfully 
collected or retained their personal information. Machines are not good 
at detecting flawed inputs, and humans are sometimes too enchanted with 
their own machine creations to do the follow-up required to ensure 
accuracy. Recourse is a necessary backstop. 
The safeguards suggested in this Article may not satisfy the state-
centric camp or the champions of the equivalency thesis. For the state-
centric camp, anything less than untrammeled discretion is a 
disappointment. The equivalency theorists, for their part, may wish for 
more onerous restrictions on machine surveillance. The model suggested 
here does not opt for either of these polar positions. However, it will 
impose accountability on machine surveillance abroad, while enabling 
innovation and protecting the public. That combination of virtues is an 
improvement over either rage or complacency. 
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